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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Mary Brooke Billings 
 
 
TEMPTING TRADING OPPORTUNITIES  
AND LITIGATION CONSEQUENCES 
 
 
This paper considers the conflicting disclosure and trading incentives faced by 
managers who become aware of negative earnings news.  Prior work indicates that potential 
legal and reputational consequences provide managers with incentives to voluntarily disclose 
this news.  Despite these incentives, managers’ warnings of negative news occur relatively 
infrequently.  Therefore, I predict and test whether the receipt of negative news provides 
some managers with incentives to delay disclosing negative news in order to trade to exploit 
information asymmetries. I find a negative relation between abnormal trade by insiders prior 
to the market’s receipt of negative earnings news and the timeliness of disclosure.  Further 
analysis indicates that abnormal trade results in increased litigation consequences for the 
firm but only limited repercussions for managers.  That is, after controlling for a number of 
factors argued to influence settlement negotiations, I document a positive relation between 
lawsuit settlement amounts and measures of abnormal trade, but I find no relation between 
abnormal trade and repercussions (in the form of employment turnover or SEC action) to 
managers involved in the trading. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Skinner (1994) finds that 25 percent of firms facing negative earnings news 
voluntarily warn of the bad news, compared to 6 percent of the firms facing good news.  He 
argues that these findings result from managers’ fear of legal liability.  Though empirical 
evidence in support of this theory is mixed (Healy and Palepu 2001, 423), recent evidence 
indicates that timely disclosure lowers the likelihood of litigation and/or reduces lawsuit 
settlement amounts (Skinner 1994, Kasznik and Lev 1995, Skinner 1997, Baginski et al. 
2002, Field et al. 2005).  If managers can indeed lower litigation costs by voluntarily 
disclosing impending negative news, one wonders why managers’ warnings remain less 
frequent than negative news events (i.e., 75 percent of Skinner’s bad news sample firms 
elected not to warn).1  This paper explicitly considers the tradeoff between increased 
litigation consequences for the firm (and potentially its managers) and tempting trading 
opportunities for managers.  Accordingly, this paper investigates whether managers delay 
disclosure of negative news and trade to exploit information asymmetries prior to supplying 
negative earnings news to the market, and, if so, whether this opportunistic behavior is 
associated with increased litigation consequences for the firm (via higher lawsuit settlement 
amounts) or for managers (via higher employment turnover or SEC action). 
An established and growing body of research examines when and how managers 
trade to exploit information asymmetries.  Studies indicate that insiders sell (delay 
purchases) before significant price decreases and buy (delay sales) before significant price 
increases (Jaffe 1974, Seyhun 1986).  Drawing upon these findings, I examine the relation 
between managers’ abnormal trade and the timeliness of their negative news disclosures.   In 
so doing, I connect the stream of literature examining insiders’ exploitation of information 
                                                             
1 Managers voluntarily warn of negative news via either management forecasts or earnings 
preannouncements.  A management forecast is an earnings projection made before the end of the quarter; 
an earnings preannouncement is an earnings projection made after the end of the quarter but before the 
formal earnings announcement.   
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asymmetries to the stream of literature examining managers’ incentives to correct 
information asymmetries via negative news warnings. 
Managers face both disclosure and trading decisions when they learn of negative 
news.  While securities laws provide penalties for failing to disclose this news in a timely 
manner, tempting trading opportunities may cause some managers to delay disclosure.  If 
managers trade profitably prior to disclosing the negative news, litigation consequences 
associated with delayed disclosure may increase, as shareholders’ attorneys may use trading 
behavior as evidence of managers’ disclosure delays (Sale 2002).  Because the strength of the 
shareholders’ case largely depends on the assertion that managers should have disclosed the 
adverse information earlier, managers may improve the shareholders’ bargaining position by 
trading profitably prior to disclosure.  Indeed, this behavior supplies evidence of the 
possession of an informational advantage.  Yet, some managers may surrender to temptation 
because the firm (and its insurance carrier) may suffer most of the consequences.  Thus, I 
also investigate whether managers’ abnormal trade prior to negative information events that 
trigger lawsuit filings is associated with increased litigation costs for firms and for managers.   
Although recent studies examining insiders’ behavior in the context of both 
bankruptcy filings and fraud revelations find evidence of abnormal trade (Seyhun and 
Bradley 1997, Summers and Sweeney 1998, Beneish 1999), many studies do not find 
evidence of abnormal trade prior to negative news events, particularly those that trigger the 
filing of shareholder lawsuits (Loderer and Sheehan 1989, Gosnell et al. 1992, Jones and 
Weingram 1996, 2005, Dechow et al. 1996, Bohn and Choi 1996, Niehaus and Roth 1999, 
Johnson et al. 2004).  These studies typically compare the number of shares sold less shares 
purchased by insiders (i.e., net shares sold) during a period of increased information 
asymmetry to a similarly constructed measure of trading behavior for a prior period (or to 
the trading behavior of a control firm’s insiders) and interpret larger net sales of shares to 
indicate that managers exploited information asymmetries.  Because the lack of results in 
these studies may stem from the use of abnormal trading metrics that bias against finding 
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insider trading, I construct alternative measures of abnormal trade (based on trading 
proceeds and wealth changes) that capture more completely managers’ trading activities 
during periods of information asymmetry.2    
I investigate the trading and disclosure behavior of managers of a sample of 379 
firms facing large, negative earnings news (causing drops in price greater than 35 percent in 
a 3-day window) during 1996 through 2002.  Using the sample firms as their own controls 
and comparing trading behavior over equal windows, my findings indicate that, on average, 
managers do engage in abnormal trade prior to the disclosure of large, negative earnings 
news, including those disclosures that trigger the filing of a shareholder lawsuit.  I then 
observe a negative relation between abnormal trade and the timeliness of managers’ 
disclosures, which is consistent with some managers delaying disclosure in order to trade 
opportunistically.3  
Given these findings, I next investigate whether this opportunistic behavior is 
associated with increased consequences for the firm or for its managers by focusing on a 
sample of 207 firms that faced shareholder lawsuits as a result of the disclosure of negative 
earnings news.  After controlling for the severity of the impending news (i.e., estimated 
shareholder damages), firm size, insurance coverage, the presence of a restatement, and a 
number of other factors thought to influence settlement negotiations, I document a positive 
relation between settlement amounts and measures of abnormal trading proceeds.  I, 
however, find limited evidence of a relation between lawsuit settlement amounts and trading 
metrics based on abnormal net shares traded, suggesting that the choice of trading metric is 
important.  Furthermore, in contrast to Skinner (1997), I find no evidence to suggest that 
timely disclosure is associated with lower lawsuit settlement amounts.  Finally, although I 
                                                             
2 Many prior studies measure trading behavior over unequal trading windows and/or omit (or improperly 
incorporate) certain types of value-increasing share transactions.  For example, in some cases, trading 
metrics using net trades fail to fully account for situations in which managers use proceeds from insider sales 
to exercise options to repurchase the firms’ shares at below-market prices or cases where managers 
immediately sell shares acquired via option exercises.  Indeed, these wealth-increasing transactions actually 
reduce the net shares traded.  In other cases, studies omit derivative transactions from the analysis entirely.  
I discuss these (and other) concerns in Chapter 1. 
3 Following Skinner (1997), I measure disclosure timeliness by calculating the number of trading days 
between the end of the fiscal quarter and the date of disclosure.   
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find evidence indicative of increased litigation consequences for firms, I find no evidence to 
suggest that the managers themselves suffer increased consequences as a result of their 
trading behavior.  Consistent with recent evidence provided by Srinivasan (2005) and Desai 
et al. (2006), I find increased management turnover following earnings restatements, but 
similar to Agrawal et al. (1999) and Beneish (1999) who examine turnover following fraud 
revelations, I find no evidence of turnover associated with opportunistic trading by managers 
of lawsuit firms.  In addition, I find no evidence to suggest that managers suffer via monetary 
penalties and/or SEC action as a result of their trading behavior.   
 This study contributes to the accounting literature in three ways.  This study adds to 
the stream of research examining managers’ disclosure incentives.  By considering the 
conflicting disclosure and trading incentives faced by managers who become aware of 
negative earnings news, the empirical evidence presented in this papers suggests that some 
managers may choose to delay the disclosure of bad news even when they know that this 
behavior might result in increased litigation costs for the firm.  This suggests that studies 
examining managers’ disclosure behavior, particularly those considering litigation 
consequences and the effect of managers’ disclosure decisions, should consider the role of 
trading incentives.  For example, Field et al. (2005) use a simultaneous equations framework 
to examine the relation between early disclosure and litigation risk but do not consider 
managers’ trading behavior in their analysis.     
This paper also contributes to the literature investigating the degree to which insiders 
exploit information asymmetries.  Prior studies fail to document that the insiders of 
defendant firms in shareholder lawsuits engage in abnormal trading prior to information 
revelations that trigger lawsuit filings (Jones and Weingram 1996, 2005, Bohn and Choi 
1996, Niehaus and Roth 1999, Johnson et al. 2004).  Consistent with findings on trading 
prior to bankruptcy filings (Seyhun and Bradley 1997) and fraud revelations (Summers and 
Sweeney 1998, Beneish 1999), I find that managers do indeed trade to exploit their 
informational advantages.  As such, I highlight important research design choices that affect 
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studies using abnormal trading metrics to assess whether insiders exploit information 
asymmetries. 
Finally, this study advances the stream of literature that examines factors that 
influence lawsuit settlement amounts.  Though settlements are negotiated and often thought 
to reflect the strength of the plaintiffs’ case (because either party could opt for a trial verdict 
rather than a negotiated settlement), a considerable body of legal literature addresses 
whether the merits of the case are reflected in the value of the settlement (Alexander 1991, 
Seligman 1994, Grundfest 1994, 1995).  After controlling for the degree to which insurance 
covers the settlement (using information hand-collected from the footnotes of firms’ 
financial statements), this study identifies influential factors that various commentators do 
and do not believe reflect the merits of the plaintiffs’ case.  As such, it informs the debate 
about the determinants of settlements in the legal literature. 
The remainder of this paper progresses as follows.  Chapter 1 provides background 
and discusses related literature.  Chapter 2 supplies the hypotheses and research design.  
Chapter 3 describes the sample selection criteria and data collection, while Chapter 4 
presents the analyses and results of the study.  Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a summary 
and discussion. 
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CHAPTER 1:  BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
I. Shareholder litigation under Rule 10b-5 
A typical class action shareholder lawsuit brought under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 alleges that managers of the company made false or misleading 
statements and/or failed to disclose material information in a timely manner to the market, 
resulting in a period of time when the firm’s stock price is artificially inflated.  The class of 
investors (known as the “plaintiff class”) who purchased the company’s stock during this 
time (known as the “class period”) claims damages that result from managers’ disclosure 
behavior.  The revelation of negative news along with a considerable drop in the firm’s stock 
price often triggers the filing of a shareholder lawsuit.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys can and do use 
managers’ trading behavior during the class period as evidence of delayed disclosure (Sale 
2002). 
Although nearly all shareholder lawsuits brought under Rule 10b-5 settle before trial, 
settlements often result in sizeable costs to the firm and/or the firm’s insurance provider.  
Despite the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) in December 
of 1995, which was intended to protect publicly traded firms from abuse of class action 
securities litigation, both the number of lawsuits filed and the average settlement amounts 
surged in recent years.4  Settlement values for accounting-related cases climbed from an 
average of $18.6 million over 1996-2000 to $24.0 million in 2001 (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2003).  Shareholder lawsuits under Rule 10b-5 and their associated resolution costs form the 
basis of the theory introduced by Skinner (1994). 
 
 
 
                                                             
4 The PSLRA aimed to reduce “strike” suits based solely on large price declines that tended to coerce 
settlements out of “deep pockets.”  Empirical evidence suggests that nuisance suits declined with the passage 
of the PSLRA (NERA 2002, Painter et al. 2002).  For further discussion of the changes introduced by the 
PSLRA, see Painter et al. (2002). 
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II. Voluntary disclosure of negative news 
Skinner (1994) suggests that aversion to legal liability causes managers to voluntarily 
warn of negative news.  In particular, Skinner (1994) indicates that U.S. securities laws 
provide incentives for managers to disclose negative news voluntarily.  Because 
announcements of large, negative earnings surprises increase the likelihood of potentially 
costly shareholder 10b-5 lawsuits, he argues that managers benefit from “preemptive” 
warnings because such early disclosures both reduce the plaintiffs’ ability to claim that 
managers failed to release material information promptly and limit the size of the plaintiff 
class by reducing the period of nondisclosure.  Accordingly, Skinner suggests that the costs of 
failing to voluntarily disclose bad news exceed the costs of failing to disclose good news.  In 
fact, legal liability actually provides disincentive for the disclosure of good news, as managers 
may be held accountable for inaccurate good news forecasts. 
Early work examining factors thought to influence managers’ disclosure decisions 
provides mixed evidence to support the premise that managers engage in voluntary 
disclosure to avoid securities litigation and/or to lower litigation costs associated with 
shareholder lawsuits (Healy and Palepu 2001, 423).  Examining a litigation sample of 45 
observations covering 1988 to 1992, Francis et al. (1994) find that managers’ warnings 
prompted 28 of the lawsuits.  In contrast, they find that 46 of 53 firms similarly vulnerable to 
litigation did not warn of the impending negative news, which suggests that warnings do not 
always deter, and in certain cases may even trigger, lawsuit filings.5  Arguing that the control 
sample of similarly “vulnerable” firms used by Francis et al. (1994) differs from the lawsuit 
sample in, among other respects, size and the extent to which the market expected the 
adverse news, Skinner (1997) re-examines the relation between disclosure and litigation.  
Unlike Francis et al. (1994), Skinner uses the litigation firms as their own controls by 
comparing the firms’ disclosure behavior during quarters when they faced litigation to their 
                                                             
5 Specifically, Francis et al. (1994) select a control sample of “at risk” firms that faced earnings declines that 
were, on average, 50 percent more than the average earnings declines reported by the sample of firms in the 
same industries that were subject to litigation. 
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disclosure behavior during quarters when they did not face litigation.  Like Francis et al. 
(1994), however, Skinner (1997) finds evidence that early disclosure does not prevent 
litigation, as disclosure during lawsuit quarters is more timely than disclosure during non-
lawsuit quarters. 
Studies focusing on the relation between disclosure and the incidence of litigation 
must consider that disclosure behavior and the probability of litigation are endogenous to the 
severity of the news, making it difficult to disentangle the effect of disclosure on the 
probability of litigation.  Determining the effect of disclosure on the probability of litigation 
is further complicated by the need to select a control sample against which to compare 
managers’ decisions to warn.  Using a simultaneous equations methodology, Field et al. 
(2005) find that early disclosure may indeed deter certain types of litigation, suggesting that 
earlier studies may suffer from problems of endogeneity.6  As such, in contrast to prior work, 
Field et al. (2005) supply evidence indicating that managers’ disclosure decisions can lower 
the likelihood of litigation. 
Examining the actual outcomes of lawsuits rather than the incidence of litigation 
eliminates the troublesome task of selecting a suitable control sample of firms facing similar 
disclosure incentives.  As such, Skinner (1997) focuses on lawsuit settlements and argues that 
a manager’s desire to reduce the costs associated with resolving a perhaps unavoidable 
lawsuit filing drives the decision to voluntarily warn of impending negative news.  In 
particular, he suggests that early disclosure strengthens the manager’s position during 
settlement negotiations.  After controlling for the severity of the impending negative news 
(via a measure of estimated shareholder damages), Skinner (1997) offers evidence to suggest 
that timely disclosure results in lower lawsuit settlement amounts.7  His analyses, however, 
do not control for several factors thought to influence lawsuit settlement amounts: firm size, 
                                                             
6 Although the research design of Field et al. (2005) addresses the endogenous nature of disclosure behavior 
and the probability of litigation, it does not consider the influence of trading incentives on managers’ 
disclosure decisions nor does it consider insider trading as a factor in lawsuit filings. 
7 Skinner (1997) measures disclosure timeliness by calculating the number of trading days between the end 
of the fiscal quarter and the date of disclosure.  Under this approach, earnings forecasts result in positive 
measures of timeliness, while both earnings preannouncements and actual earnings announcements result 
in negative measures of timeliness.   
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insurance coverage, and the presence of a restatement (Alexander 1991, Painter et al. 2002, 
Wu 2002, NERA 2006, PwC 2006).    
In addition to examining the basic prediction that voluntary disclosure deters 
litigation and/or lowers litigation costs, other work indirectly suggests that the fear of legal 
liability causes managers to warn.  For example, Baginski et al. (2002) examine whether the 
differing legal regimes in the U.S. and Canada are associated with differences in disclosure 
behavior, such as differences in the types and degree of information firms convey.  They find 
that managers of Canadian firms, faced with an arguably similar business environment but 
less litigious legal environment, are more likely to disclose good news relative to U.S. firms.  
Furthermore, Canadian managers’ good news disclosures tend to be more precise and cover 
longer horizons.  This finding lends credit to the idea that managers are more likely to 
voluntarily release good news when they are less fearful of being held accountable for 
inaccurate forecasts.8  In summary, though evidence remains mixed, recent evidence 
indicates that timely disclosure lowers the likelihood of litigation and/or reduces lawsuit 
settlement amounts.  
 
III. Trading opportunities and managers’ disclosure decisions 
Although recent work indicates that managers can lower litigation costs by 
voluntarily disclosing negative news (Skinner 1997, Field et al. 2005), Skinner (1994)’s 
empirical findings show that managers do so only 25 percent of the time.  When managers 
learn of impending negative earnings news, they face a tempting trading opportunity.  That 
is, managers must decide whether to reduce the firm’s expected litigation costs by warning of 
the news or to delay the news and profit personally by trading to exploit information 
asymmetries.  If the potential trading profits reach sufficient levels, managers may engage in 
disclosure behavior that allows them to profit personally at the expense of shareholders.   
                                                             
8 The findings of Baginski et al. (2002) do not preclude reputational concerns from playing a role in 
disclosure.  For example, it is not clear that managers in Canada are not “managing expectations” while 
managers in the U.S. are “managing earnings.” 
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 The investors who sued Scholastic Corporation claim managers did just that, as 
shown by the graph in Panel A of Figure 1.  In a complaint filed on April 7, 1997, shareholders 
alleged that Scholastic and its Vice President of Finance and Investor Relations concealed a 
material decline in Goosebump book sales and a material increase in returns of Goosebump 
books, resulting in an artificially inflated stock price during the period from December 10, 
1996 through February 20, 1997.  The plaintiffs argued that this delay allowed the Vice 
President to sell 80 percent of his holdings of Scholastic stock at the artificially high price for 
proceeds of approximately $2 million, while they bought shares at the artificially high price 
before Scholastic supplied the negative news to the market. 
As shown by the graph in Panel B of Figure 1, the investors of PRI Automation, Inc. 
tell a similar story.  In a complaint filed November 20, 2000, shareholders claimed that 
throughout the first three quarters of 2000 management of PRI misrepresented its 
competitive position as a manufacturer in the semiconductor industry.9  During the class 
period (January 27, 2000 through September 11, 2000),  insiders (including the CEO, CFO, 
Chairman of the Board, VPs, and Directors) sold shares to the public at prices ranging from 
$65 to $88 per share, reaping trading proceeds in excess of $22 million.  Via a conference 
call and press release after close of trading on September 11, 2000, managers warned 
analysts and investors of manufacturing problems that would seriously impact fourth quarter 
results.  Upon the market’s receipt of this negative news, PRI's stock price fell 39% in a single 
day, from a closing price of $42.68 on September 11, 2000, to a closing price of $25.87 on 
September 12, 2000. 
                                                             
9 The class period begins on January 27, 2000, when PRI announced earnings for the first quarter.  On that 
day, PRI reported net revenue for the first quarter of $58.7 million (a 98% increase from the first quarter of 
the prior fiscal year) and net income for the quarter of $294,000, or $0.01 per share (an improvement from 
the net loss of $7.7 million, or $0.36 per share, in the first quarter of the prior fiscal year).  At the time, PRI’s 
CEO Mitch Tyson made a number of comments suggesting these numbers were likely to persist, including  
"We emerge from the downturn a stronger, more competitive company well positioned for the opportunities 
we see ahead . . . PRI is well positioned to offer manufacturers a broad range of integrated factory 
automation systems, software and services to address their total manufacturing requirements."  Managers at 
PRI made similar statements throughout the first 3 quarters of 2000, including when announcing the results 
for the second and third quarter.  (PR Newswire 2000) 
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The settlements reached in both the Scholastic Corporation and PRI Automation, 
Inc. cases suggest that the managers profited from their trading and disclosure decisions.  In 
the case of Scholastic, the parties reached a cash settlement of $7.5 million.  In September of 
2002, Scholastic announced it would record a non-recurring pre-tax charge of $1.9 million in 
the third quarter of 2002, which represents the portion of the $7.5 million that was not 
covered by insurance and is less than the approximately $2 million of trading proceeds 
enjoyed by insiders during the class period.  PRI did not have insurance coverage for the 
claims.  The parties, however, reached a cash settlement of $3.25 million, which is far less 
than the approximately $22 million in trading proceeds reaped by insiders during the early 
part of the class period.  
While this anecdotal evidence speaks to the profitability of managers’ disclosure and 
trading decisions, it remains unclear whether the settlement amounts would have been even 
smaller had the managers disclosed earlier and/or refrained from trading.  In both lawsuits, 
shareholders used managers’ trading behavior as evidence of the violation of Rule 10b-5.  
This suggests that not only did the managers fail to help their case by disclosing earlier, but 
they also hurt the firms’ positions in settlement discussions by engaging in trading that gives 
the appearance that they took advantage of their knowledge of impending negative news. 
These two cases highlight a key assumption of studies examining theories of legal 
liability: the strength of the shareholders’ case affects their success at the bargaining table.  
Because the strength of the plaintiffs’ case largely depends on the assertion that management 
should have disclosed the adverse information earlier, defendants may reduce the strength of 
the plaintiffs’ case by voluntarily supplying the adverse information.  At the same time, 
defendants may strengthen the plaintiffs’ bargaining position by trading profitably during the 
class period, which may signal managers’ awareness of information asymmetries.  
Though the parties negotiate a settlement, a considerable body of research argues 
that settlements do not always reflect the merits of the case (Alexander 1991, Grundfest 1994, 
1995, Seligman 1994).  Grundfest (1994) suggests that defendants frequently “complain of a 
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wave of litigation that unfairly targets ‘deep pockets’” and “confuses legitimate volatility with 
corporate fraud.”  Because defendants feel coerced to settle rather than face the potentially 
large legal costs involved with fighting even the most frivolous class action shareholder 
lawsuit, Alexander (1991) argues that “settlements are not voluntary in that trial is not 
regarded by the parties as a practically available alternative for resolving the dispute, and 
they are not accurate in that the strength of the case on the merits has little or nothing to do 
with determining the amount of the settlement” (Alexander 1991, 3).  In support of her 
theory, Alexander provides evidence that most securities lawsuits settle before trial and the 
settlement amounts vary little with the perceived strength of the case; rather, she finds that 
settlement amounts routinely reflect a “going rate” consistent with the “familiar axiom that a 
bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial” (Alexander 1991, 1).10  Indeed, since 
the passage of the PSLRA, no case has gone to trial; all have either been settled or dismissed 
(Painter et al. 2002). 
In summary, though prior work suggests that managers’ fear of costly 10b-5 lawsuits 
causes them to warn of impending negative news, evidence exists to indicate that, in some 
cases, management may exercise the option to delay disclosure – even though this may 
increase the litigation costs incurred by the firm.  Furthermore, the degree to which 
profitable trading behavior affects the litigation consequences for managers remains unclear. 
 
IV. Evidence of abnormal trade by insiders 
A large body of research examines when and how managers trade to exploit 
information asymmetries.  Early studies indicate that insiders sell (delay purchases) before 
significant price decreases and buy (delay sales) before significant price increases (Jaffe 1974, 
Seyhun 1986).  Given those findings, current work focuses on abnormal trade by insiders 
prior to large, negative corporate news events.  Initial studies examining insiders’ behavior in 
                                                             
10 Similarly, Grundfest (1994) cites the fact that “one-eighth of all firms listed on the NYSE have been sued in 
the past five years, and virtually all have paid some amount in settlement of plaintiffs’ claims” as evidence of 
the “hydraulic” pressure to settle (Grundfest 1994, 973). 
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the context of both bankruptcy filings and fraud revelations failed to find evidence of 
abnormal trade (Loderer and Sheehan 1989, Gosnell et al. 1992, Dechow et al. 1996).  Recent 
papers, however, employ alternative research designs and find that managers do exploit 
information asymmetries in these settings (Seyhun and Bradley 1997, Summers and Sweeney 
1998, and Beneish 1999).   
Using a larger sample of daily trading data and an alternative method to calculate 
abnormal trading activity that considers the timing and size of transactions, Seyhun and Bradley 
(1997) supply evidence that insiders sell their holdings in order to limit their losses prior to 
bankruptcy filings. Summers and Sweeney (1998) find evidence of abnormal selling activity by 
insiders of 51 fraud firms as compared to the selling behavior of insiders of industry- and size-
matched control firms.  Similarly, Beneish (1999) finds that managers of 64 firms that faced SEC 
enforcement actions were more likely to sell shares in periods of overstated earnings than were 
managers of industry- and age-matched control firms.    
In contrast to the above results, many studies do not find evidence of abnormal trade 
prior to corporate news events, particularly those information events that trigger the filing of 
shareholder lawsuits (Jones and Weingram 1996, 2005, Dechow et al. 1996, Bohn and Choi 
1996, Niehaus and Roth 1999, Johnson et al. 2004).11  For example, the findings of Jones and 
Weingram (1996) suggest that insider trade does not influence litigation risk.  Johnson et al. 
(2004) find a significant correlation between incidence of litigation and insider selling after 
the PSLRA, but do not find one between litigation and abnormal selling either before or after 
                                                             
11 A sample of firms facing litigation under Rule 10b-5 differs from a sample of firms facing allegations of 
fraud in important respects.  First, fraud firms represent a small subsample within the full population of 
litigation firms.  Second, the nature of the allegations with respect to managers’ behavior varies across 
groups.  While fraud cases focus on managers’ reporting behavior, claims under Rule 10b-5 typically focus on 
the disclosure behavior of managers.  Managers of fraud firms allegedly create information asymmetries; 
managers of lawsuit firms allegedly perpetuate and/or fail to correct information asymmetries.  Third, 
expectations regarding the timing of information revelations differ.   Managers of fraud firms cannot 
necessarily control (or even predict) whether and/or when their fraudulent reporting behavior will be 
revealed (by auditors, the SEC, others within the firm, etc.).  In these cases, managers’ own poor reporting 
behavior is the negative news. Alternatively, managers of 10b-5 litigation firms make their trading and 
disclosure decisions with the expectation of the market’s eventual receipt of negative news.  In these cases, 
managers can predict (and may even control) when the negative news will be revealed.  Thus, the managers 
of the litigation firms trade with the expectation of the market’s receipt of negative news, while the managers 
of the fraud firms do not necessarily trade with the expectation of SEC action.  Consequently, whether the 
results found in studies examining trading behavior prior to fraud revelations generalize to the population of 
litigation firms remains an open question. 
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the PSLRA.  Likewise, Niehaus and Roth (1999) find that managers are net sellers during 
lawsuit class periods but that the level of these sales is not significantly different from their 
prior trading activity.  Finally, Bohn and Choi (1996) find no evidence of abnormal selling in 
defendant firms that were targeted by suits alleging fraud during initial public offerings.  
In summary, though many prior studies investigate the degree to which managers 
trade to exploit information asymmetries prior to large, corporate news events, evidence of 
opportunistic behavior in the context of shareholder litigation remains scarce.  In addition, 
many studies examining litigation risk frequently do not consider trading behavior (e.g., 
Field et al. 2005).  Next, I describe how the lack of results in prior studies may stem from 
limitations associated with the measurement of abnormal trade.  
 
V. Limitations of current measures of abnormal trade 
Studies typically measure the amount of stock sold (in shares) less stock purchased 
(in shares) by insiders during a period of increased information asymmetry and compare it to 
a similarly constructed measure of trading behavior for a prior period (or to the trading 
behavior of a control firm’s insiders).12  Prior literature interprets larger net sales to indicate 
that managers exploited “bad news” information asymmetries.  Such measures, however, do 
not always incorporate appropriate benchmarks for “normal” trading and may fail to 
consider certain types of value-increasing transactions. 
 Seyhun and Bradley (1997) indicate that early work investigating insider trading 
prior to bankruptcy filings (Loderer and Sheehan 1989, Gosnell et al. 1992) biased against 
findings by selecting size- and industry-matched control firms.13  Following Seyhun and 
                                                             
12 If not focused on net sales, studies frequently examine a measure of the number of total trades and/or the 
number of shares sold.  For example, Niehaus and Roth (1999) examine both the number of sale trades by 
insiders divided by the total number of trades and the number of shares sold by insiders relative to the total 
number of shares traded by insiders during the class period.  They then compare these trading metrics 
calculated during the class period to those same metrics during the two years prior.  
13 Emphasizing the importance of selecting an appropriate control sample against which to compare trading 
behavior, Seyhun and Bradley (1997, 193) argue that “the important research question is whether the 
insiders of firms that file bankruptcy sell their shares before filing.  It is not whether the insiders of filing 
firms sell more than insiders of firms that are in financial distress but do not file a formal bankruptcy 
petition.”      
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Bradley (1997), I construct abnormal trading metrics by comparing measures of managers’ 
trading proceeds during a period of alleged increased information asymmetry to measures of 
those same managers’ trading proceeds during a prior (control) period.  At the same time, 
studies that use the managers as their own controls potentially bias findings by comparing 
trading behavior measured over unequal trading windows (Niehaus and Roth 1999, Johnson 
et al. 2004).  Because of these concerns, I calculate abnormal trading metrics by comparing 
trading over equal trading windows. 
While the selection of appropriate control samples and comparable trading windows 
may influence prior findings, the choice of trading metric may also affect results.  By focusing 
on net shares sold by insiders (as opposed to trading proceeds), measures used in prior 
studies may fail to adequately reflect the degree to which insiders trade profitably during the 
period.  Further, some studies limit analysis to open market transactions, excluding, among 
others, derivative security transactions, secondary equity offerings, and transactions 
associated with acquisitions and dispositions.  Consequently, these trading metrics 
(calculated in shares or in dollars) may fail to fully account for situations in which managers 
use proceeds from insider sales to exercise options to repurchase the firms’ shares at below-
market prices or situations in which managers immediately sell shares acquired via option 
exercises. 
Niehaus and Roth (1999) limit analysis to open market transactions, arguing that 
“[o]ther transactions, such as the exercise of options, are more likely to be related to the 
characteristics of a firm’s compensation package than to inside information,” (Niehaus and 
Roth 1999, page 61).  While the receipt of stock options likely results from compensation 
packages, I argue that the exercise of options likely plays an important role in the 
profitability of an insider’s overall trading strategy. 
Beneish (1999, 436) argues that Dechow et al. (1996) biased against findings by 
employing measures that failed to take into account insider purchases, as insiders of control 
firms more likely purchase shares during the period.  Because managers rarely (if ever) 
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purchase their firms’ shares at the market price (opting to exercise options to buy instead), 
studies that limit analysis to open market transactions when calculating a measure of sales 
less purchases (rather than sales alone) actually suffer from this same bias.  Yet, studies that 
do incorporate derivative security transactions in the analysis often do so in a way that biases 
against findings, as a measure of shares traded that nets out purchases actually biases the 
trading metric downward with the inclusion of option exercises.  In these studies, the 
exercise of in-the-money options to purchase the firms’ shares (i.e., wealth-increasing 
transactions) actually reduces the abnormal trading metric.  For example, using a measure of 
net shares traded allows the exercise of options to purchase 100 shares at $10 per share to 
negate the open-market sale of 100 shares at $100 per share, resulting in a downwardly 
biased trading metric.  
The trading behavior of PRI Automation insiders illustrates the concerns over the 
choice of trading metric and the exclusion (or improper inclusion) of derivative transactions.  
The exercise of in-the-money options results in zero or even negative net shares traded for 
four of six insiders.  Yet, all six PRI insiders enjoy positive trading proceeds (totaling $22 
million) during the class period.  The trading behavior of insiders at IMP, Inc., as shown in 
Figure 2, offers additional evidence to support these concerns.  In a complaint filed on 
October 1, 1996, IMP shareholders allege that: 
“[Positive statements] enabled eight of IMP's insiders to engage in a 
remarkable burst of insider trading, selling 1,196,200 shares of their IMP 
stock at artificially inflated prices as high as $22.31 per share between May 3, 
1996 and May 24, 1996, pocketing over $23.7 million for themselves -- with 
most of IMP's insiders unloading large portions of their holdings of IMP stock, 
immediately after exercising stock options to acquire the shares at just $.81-
$2.25 per share -- thus obtaining huge, risk-free profits from insider trading.”  
(CV-96-20826 IMP, Inc. Class Action Complaint, 1) 
 
In both of these cases, a measure of net shares traded fails to indicate the degree to 
which insiders profited during the period.  I present my hypotheses and discuss how I 
address these methodological concerns in detail in the Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 2:  HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
I. Opportunistic trading behavior and disclosure timeliness 
Taken collectively, the stream of literature examining disclosure behavior and legal 
liability suggests that managers benefit from the timely disclosure of negative news.  Yet, in 
spite of these benefits, voluntary disclosures of negative news by managers remain relatively 
infrequent (Skinner 1994, Kasznik and Lev 1995).  When presented with valuable 
information that will impact the future price of their firm’s securities, managers may be 
tempted to delay disclosure and trade to exploit the information.  This leads to the following 
hypothesis regarding managers’ disclosure and trading behavior: 
Hypothesis 1:  Abnormal trade by managers facing negative 
earnings news is associated with less timely disclosure of the 
news 
 
To test my first hypothesis, I calculate measures of managers’ disclosure and trading 
behavior prior to large, negative news disclosures.  Following Skinner (1997), I calculate a 
measure of disclosure timeliness (
! 
TIMELINESS ) for each firm by counting the number of 
days between the negative news disclosure and the end of the fiscal period.  Under this 
approach, earnings forecasts result in positive measures of timeliness, while both earnings 
preannouncements and actual earnings announcements result in negative measures of 
timeliness.   
I evaluate the trading behavior of managers by constructing trading metrics based on 
both open market and derivative transactions of insiders during the year leading up to the 
negative news disclosure.  For the subset of firms facing lawsuits, I examine the trading 
during the shorter period of the year leading up to the disclosure or the class period based on 
the begin (
! 
CBdate ) and end (
! 
CEdate ) dates alleged in the first identified complaint.  That is, 
I focus on managers’ trading behavior during the period of time that they allegedly enjoyed 
increased information asymmetry.  The first measure, 
! 
TP , represents the total dollar amount 
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of (net) trading proceeds reaped by insiders during the period prior to the negative news 
disclosure. 
! 
Trading Proceeds (TP) = Salesi, j "TRPricei, j  -  Purchasesi, j "TRPrice i, j( )
j=1
K
#
i=1
N
# ,                    (1) 
where: 
! 
N  = the number of insiders; 
! 
K  = the number of transactions by insider
! 
i  during the period; 
! 
Sales = the number of shares sold by insider
! 
i  in transaction
! 
j ; 
! 
Purchases = the number of shares purchased by insider
! 
i  in transaction
! 
j ; and 
! 
TRPrice  = the price at which insider
! 
i  transacts for transaction
! 
j . 
 
I calculate a second trading metric, 
! 
"IW , that focuses on the degree to which managers’ 
trading increases their overall wealth. 
! 
"InsiderWealth ("IW) =
CEHoldingsi #CEPrice i $CBHoldingsi #CBPricei( ) +
Salesi, j #TRPricei, j $Purchasesi, j #TRPrice i, j( ) + Offeringsi
j=1
K
%
& 
' 
( 
( 
( 
) 
* 
+ 
+ 
+ i=1
N
% ,     (2) 
where: 
 
! 
CEPrice  = the firm’s stock price one day after the end of the class period. 
! 
CBPrice  = the firm’s stock price at the beginning of the period. 
! 
CEHoldings  = the total amount of shares held by insider i at the end of the 
period. 
! 
CBHoldings = the total amount of shares held by insider i at the beginning of the 
period. 
! 
Offerings
i
 = the total dollar amount of cash proceeds from secondary offerings 
received by insider i during the period. 
 
Finally, to facilitate comparison to prior studies, I calculate two additional trading metrics: a 
measure of net shares traded (
! 
NST ) during the period (Summers and Sweeney 1998, 
Niehaus and Roth 1999, Johnson et al. 2004) and a measure of net shares traded deflated by 
shares outstanding (
! 
NST _ SHS ) (Beneish and Vargus 2002). 
! 
Net Shares Traded (NST) = Salesi, j  -  Purchasesi, j( )
j=1
K
"
i=1
N
"  .            (3) 
 
! 
Net Shares Traded (NST_SHS) = Salesi, j /SHS -  Purchasesi, j /SHS( )
j=1
K
"
i=1
N
" ,          (4) 
where:  
! 
SHS  = the shares outstanding on the date of transaction
! 
j . 
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I calculate abnormal trading metrics by subtracting the equivalent trading measures 
calculated over a trading window of equal length leading up to the beginning of the period.  I 
denote abnormal trading metrics as 
! 
ATP , 
! 
A"IW , 
! 
ANST , and 
! 
ANST _ SHS .  Following 
prior work, I focus on the trading behavior of directors, officers, presidents, and vice 
presidents (Beneish 1999, Beneish and Vargus 2002).14   
After calculating measures of managers’ disclosure and trading behavior, I 
investigate the relation between timeliness and abnormal trade by estimating the following 
regression model: 
! 
TIMELINESS
i
 = 
! 
"
o
+"
1
TRADING
i
+"
2
VOLATILITY
i
+"
3
SHARE _TURNOVER
i
+"
4
SIZE
i
+"
5
HILIT
i
+"
6
FALL
i
+ #
i
.         (5) 
 
In Equation (5), my first hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient for 
! 
TRADING  (i.e., 
! 
"
1
< 0), 
as measured by the trading metrics I describe in Equations (1) through (4).   Given the 
methodological concerns discussed in Chapter 1, the predicted negative relation may not 
manifest when I include 
! 
NST  or 
! 
NST _ SHS  as the proxies for trading in the model.   
I include additional variables to control for factors thought to influence the 
timeliness of disclosure.  Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest that variability in performance 
may capture information to which managers do not have prior access.  Consistent with this 
argument, Field et al. (2005) find a negative relation between stock volatility and the 
probability of disclosure.  Because higher volatility may also lead to less timely earnings 
warnings, I expect a negative relation between 
! 
TIMELINESS   and 
! 
VOLATILITY , a measure of 
the standard deviation of monthly returns during the six months prior to the negative news 
disclosure (i.e., 
! 
"
2
< 0 ).   On the other hand, studies examining litigation risk suggest that 
larger firm size and increased share turnover provide managers with incentives for more 
timely disclosure of negative news (Jones and Weingram 1996, Johnson et al. 2000).  In 
addition, prior work examining voluntary disclosure finds a positive relation between firm 
size and the frequency of disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 1993, Kasznik and Lev 1995).  
                                                             
14 As discussed in the next Chapter, in analyses that focus on a subset of lawsuit firms that face trading 
allegations, I focus on the trading behavior of only those insiders named in the first identified complaint. 
 20 
Accordingly, I include a measure of the average ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding 
during the period, 
! 
SHARE _TURNOVER, and a measure of market capitalization, 
! 
MVE , with 
the expectation of a positive coefficient for each (i.e., 
! 
"
3
> 0, "
4
> 0).   
Similarly, I include an indicator variable equal to one if the firm operates in a high-
litigation industry (
! 
HILIT ) and a measure of the severity of the negative news (
! 
FALL , the 
size-adjusted return during the 3-day window surrounding the negative news disclosure).15  I 
expect positive coefficients for 
! 
HILIT  and 
! 
FALL  (i.e., 
! 
"
5
> 0, "
6
> 0 ), as they both indicate 
increased incentive for early disclosure.  Yet, Lang and Lundholm (1993, 250) indicate that, 
taken collectively, theoretical and empirical evidence examining the link between disclosure 
and firm performance suggests that disclosure could be increasing, constant, or even 
decreasing in firm performance and that it may even vary based on the type of disclosure.  
This suggests conflicting predictions for 
! 
"
6
.  At the same time, relying on Skinner’s theory, 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest that legal incentives may play a role in disclosure if 
managers know that the information will become publicly available in the short term (as is 
the case with impending earnings news). 
 
II. Consequences for the firm 
If managers trade profitably during the class period, plaintiffs’ attorneys may use 
their trading behavior as evidence of delayed disclosure (Sale 2002).  The findings of Skinner 
(1997) and Field et al. (2005) suggest that managers benefit from “preemptive” warnings 
perhaps because such early disclosures both reduce the plaintiffs’ ability to claim that 
management failed to release material information promptly and limit the size of the plaintiff 
class by reducing the period of nondisclosure.  Because the strength of the plaintiffs’ case 
largely depends on the assertion that management should have disclosed the adverse 
                                                             
15 Soffer et al. (2000) and Francis et al. (1994) define “high-litigation” industries as: biotechnology (SIC 
codes 2833-2836), computers (3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics (3600-3674), and retailing (5200-
5961).  Kasznik and Lev (1995) define “high-litigation” using industries with SIC codes 2833-2836, 8731-
8734, 7371-7379, 3570-3577, and 3600-3674.  I code a high-litigation variable (HILIT) to indicate firms in 
any of the above SIC codes.      
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information earlier, defendants (i.e., managers) may strengthen the plaintiffs’ (i.e., 
shareholders’) bargaining position by trading profitably during the class period.  Thus, I 
predict that abnormal trade by managers during the class period is associated with increased 
litigation consequences.  This leads to the following hypothesis regarding the relation 
between managers’ trading behavior and litigation consequences for the firm: 
Hypothesis 2:  Abnormal trade by managers during the class 
period is associated with increased lawsuit settlement amounts  
 
I investigate my second hypothesis using the following regression model: 
! 
SETTLEMENT
i
 =
! 
"
o
+ "
1
TRADING
i
+ "
2
TIMELINESS
i
+ "
3
DAMAGES
i
+ "
4
SIZE
i
+"
5
RESTATEMENT
i
+ "
6
INSURANCE
i
+ #
i
.         (6) 
My second hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient for 
! 
TRADING  (i.e., 
! 
"
1
> 0 ), as 
measured by the trading metrics I describe in Equations (1) through (4).   As previously 
discussed, the predicted positive relation may not manifest when I include 
! 
NST  or 
! 
NST _ SHS  as the proxies for trading in the model.  Following Skinner (1997), I include both 
a measure of disclosure timeliness and a measure of estimated shareholder damages.  
Relying on prior work examining disclosure behavior and legal liability (e.g., Skinner 1994, 
1997 Kasznik and Lev 1995, Baginski et al. 2002, Field et al. 2005), I expect a negative 
coefficient for 
! 
TIMELINESS  (i.e., 
! 
"
2
< 0).  Because the inclusion of 
! 
DAMAGES   (measured as 
the decline of market capitalization from the trading day when it reached its maximum 
during the class period to the trading day immediately following the end of the class period) 
controls for the severity of the news disclosed, I expect a positive coefficient (i.e., 
! 
"
3
> 0).   
I include the remaining variables to control for other factors thought to influence 
lawsuit settlement amounts.  Relying on the “deep pockets” argument advanced in the legal 
literature, I predict a positive coefficient for 
! 
SIZE  , as measured by 
! 
MVE  or the volume of 
shares traded during the class period (
! 
VOLUME ).  Related work suggests a positive relation 
between the presence of a restatement and litigation risk (Wu 2002, Johnson et al. 2004); 
consequently, I expect a positive coefficient on 
! 
RESTATEMENT  , an indicator variable set 
 22 
equal to one if the firm restates class period earnings and/or announces a restatement during 
the class period (i.e., 
! 
"
5
> 0).    
Recent studies argue that insurance coverage plays an important role in the 
negotiation of settlements (Peng and Roell 2004, Choi 2005).  To control for insurance 
coverage in this regression, I include a variable (
! 
INSURANCE ) that measures the percentage 
of the settlement amount covered by the firm’s insurance carrier.  In addition, I also estimate 
Equation (6) using the settlement amount net of insurance coverage (i.e., 
! 
SETTLEMENT " (1# INSURANCE)) as the dependent variable, while removing the 
insurance coverage as an independent variable from the regression. 
 
III. Consequences for managers 
Prior research examining management turnover as a consequence of corporate fraud, 
earnings restatements, and shareholder litigation offers mixed results.  While Beneish (1999) 
and Agrawal et al. (1999) find no evidence of increased turnover following fraud incidences, 
Desai et al. (2006) do find evidence of increased turnover following restatements.16  In 
addition, both Strahan (1998) and Niehaus and Roth (1999) supply evidence consistent with 
a dramatic increase in turnover following lawsuit filings. 
Examining the role executive compensation plays in inducing behavior that may 
trigger the filing of a shareholder lawsuit, Peng and Roell (2004, 5) highlight the difficulty of 
punishing managers criminally when most cases settle without admissions of guilt while the 
company itself and/or its insurance company pays the settlement.  Peng and Roell (2004) do 
note, however, the career consequences (e.g., turnover) associated with lawsuit filings.  If 
managers’ trading behavior results in increased litigation consequences for the firm, 
employment consequences for managers of lawsuit firms may increase as well.  This leads to 
the following hypothesis regarding the relation between trading behavior and employment 
consequences for managers of lawsuit firms: 
                                                             
16 Srinivasan (2005) also finds evidence of increased turnover for outside directors following the incidence of 
an accounting restatement. 
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Hypothesis 3:  Abnormal trade is associated with higher turnover 
for managers of lawsuit firms. 
 
I examine my third hypothesis by analyzing management turnover within lawsuit 
firms during the period following the disclosure of the negative news through the settlement 
of the lawsuit.  Niehaus and Roth (1999) provide evidence to suggest that CEOs of lawsuit 
firms face an increased probability of turnover when compared to the CEOs of similar size- 
and industry-matched firms.  My third hypothesis predicts that within the lawsuit firms, 
turnover will be higher for CEOs confronted with evidence of abnormal trading prior to the 
lawsuit filing.  Consequently, I test this hypothesis by partitioning the lawsuit sample based 
on insider trading allegations and comparing the rates of CEO turnover.  In addition, I 
estimate the following regression model in order to control for additional factors thought to 
influence turnover: 
! 
TURNOVER
i
 = 
! 
"
o
+ "
1
TRADING
i
+ "
2
CEO_ AGE
i
+ "
3
DAMAGES
i
+"
4
SETTLEMENT
i
+ "
5
SIZE
i
+ "
6
RESTATEMENT
i
+ #
i
.          (7) 
 In this regression, I code two variables to indicate CEO turnover.  The first, 
! 
CEO_TURN , I set equal to one if the CEO of the firm at the end of the class period no longer 
holds that position a year after the firm settles the lawsuit.  The second, 
! 
CEO_LEAVE , I set 
equal to one if the CEO of the firm at the end of the class period is no longer with the firm a 
year after the firm settles the lawsuit.  My third hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient for 
! 
TRADING  (i.e., 
! 
"
1
> 0), as measured by the trading metrics I describe in Equations (1) 
through (4).  Following Niehaus and Roth (1999), I include the following variables as 
controls.  I expect positive coefficients for 
! 
CEO_ AGE  (measured as the age of the CEO at 
the date of the lawsuit filing), 
! 
SETTLEMENT , and 
! 
SIZE   and a negative coefficient for 
! 
DAMAGES .   
The findings of Srinivasan (2005) and Desai et al. (2006) suggest the need to control 
for the presence of an accounting restatement when examining the relation between 
managers’ trading behavior and employment consequences.  Consequently, I include 
! 
RESTATEMENT  in the above regression and predict a positive relation.  Because Srinivasan 
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(2005) finds limited evidence of SEC action in his analysis, I investigate whether managers 
who engage in abnormal trade face increased monetary penalties and/or SEC action 
associated with the securities lawsuit.  Specifically, I perform a full-text search  (based on 
both company name and plaintiffs named on the first identified complaint) of both Lexis-
Nexis and the SEC litigation database (http://sec.gov) to identify enforcement actions and 
monetary penalties that relate to defendant firms and their managers.   
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CHAPTER 3:  SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
I. Sample selection 
To test my first hypothesis regarding managers’ disclosure and trading behavior, I 
assemble a sample of firms facing large, negative earnings news by starting with firms that 
suffered large price declines.  As described in Panel A of Table 2, I begin by obtaining a list of 
CRSP firms suffering greater than a 35 percent drop in price in a 3-day window during 1996 
through 2002.  Of these 854 firms, 173 are not included in Thomson Financial’s trading 
database, while sufficient time-series data for the calculation of abnormal trading metrics are 
not available for 101 IPO firms and 97 other firms.  After removing 66 firms with non-
earnings related negative news triggering the drop in price, 19 firms suffering price drops 
surrounding the events of September 11, 2001, and 19 firms with small prices, 379 firms 
remain in the final negative earnings news sample (“negative news sample”). 
In order to test my second and third hypotheses regarding the litigation and 
employment consequences for firms and their managers, I assemble a sample of firms that 
face a shareholder lawsuit under Rule 10b-5 as a result of the managers’ disclosure behavior 
surrounding the market’s receipt of negative earnings news.  As described in Panel B of Table 
2, I begin by obtaining a sample of 513 firms that faced shareholder lawsuits during the 
period of 1996 through 2002 from litigation databases maintained by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (“PwC”) and Stanford University 
(http://securities.stanford.edu/). 
Following Skinner (1994, 1997), I isolate earnings-based 10b-5 lawsuits by excluding 
lawsuits that allege fraud schemes or that relate to IPO allocations, analysts or mutual funds.  
Consequently, the final “lawsuit sample” consists of 207 firms.  Of those 207 lawsuits, 116 
involve allegations of insider trading as evidence of managers’ incentive for delayed 
disclosure.  For these 116 trading allegation firms, I focus my analysis on the insiders 
specifically named in the first identified complaint.  Accordingly, I calculate trading metrics 
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for 463 individuals facing trading allegations.  Of the 113 negative news firms facing 
shareholder lawsuits, 62 appear in the final lawsuit sample with sufficient data availability 
and 32 appear in the sample of trading allegation firms.  Figure 3 depicts the effect of sample 
selection criteria on sample size and describes the ways in which the samples overlap. 
 
II. Data sources 
For the lawsuits with available settlement information, I obtain relevant lawsuit 
information and confirm its accuracy by hand-collecting data from the following sources: 
•  PwC Securities Litigation Database:  Among other information, the PwC 
database supplies the company name, class period dates, filing date, settlement 
amount, and settlement form (i.e., cash only, stock only, cash and stock).  
 
•  Stanford Securities Litigation Database:  I confirm class period and filing 
dates by checking the PwC dates to Stanford’s database.  
 
•  First Identified Complaint:  I examine the first identified complaint for each 
lawsuit in order to categorize the nature of the lawsuit (e.g., fraud, IPO-related, 
earnings-based), as well as identify whether plaintiffs’ attorneys allege insider 
trading or the issuance of secondary equity offering as evidence of managers’ 
wrongdoing.  In addition to identifying the firms that face allegations of insider 
trading in connection with the lawsuit, I assemble a list of individual executives 
identified as traders in the complaint. 
 
•  SEC Filings:  I obtain settlement information, including the amount covered by 
the company’s director and officer liability insurance (net of any deductibles) by 
reading footnotes of the firms’ quarterly and annual SEC filings following the filing 
of the lawsuit through the year following the date of settlement (http://sec.gov). 
 
•  Lexis-Nexis, Dow Jones News Service:  Performing a full-text search of news 
articles via Lexis-Nexis and Dow Jones News Service (using the company name and 
keywords of “lawsuit” and “class action”), I confirm the nature of the lawsuit 
allegations, class period dates, settlement amount, insurance coverage, and 
settlement form.   
 
In addition to lawsuit information, I collect data for both the negative news sample 
(n=379) and the lawsuit sample (n=207) from the following sources: 
•  Disclosure Data:  I hand-collect disclosure dates and quarterly earnings report 
dates by performing full-text searches of both Lexis-Nexis and Dow Jones News 
Services. 
   
•  Insider Trading Data:  Thomson Financial supplies the insider filing data I use to 
calculate the abnormal trading metrics.   
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•  CEO Consequences Data: I obtain executive compensation data, including 
management turnover, from the Compustat Executive Compensation (“Execucomp”) 
Database and from the firms’ SEC filings.  I hand-collect missing data items and 
confirm Execucomp data by examining the firms’ proxy statements leading up to the 
end of the class period and through a year after the date of settlement 
(http://sec.gov).  I perform a full-text search (based on company name and/or 
plaintiffs named on the first identified complaint) of the SEC litigation database to 
identify enforcement actions that relate to defendant firms (http://sec.gov). 
 
 
 
III. Control variables 
In addition to the variables of interest, analyses include controls for insurance 
coverage, restatements, firm size, auditor quality, and estimated shareholder damages.  As 
previously noted, I gather insurance coverage data from the footnotes of firms quarterly and 
annual SEC filings in the years following the settlement of the lawsuit.  In addition to 
searching SEC filings, I perform a full-text search of news articles via Dow Jones News 
Service (using the company name and keywords of “restate” and “restatement” in the year of 
the lawsuit filing) to identify restatements.  I obtain information required for damage 
calculations, firm size and classification of industry membership from CRSP. 
Table 1 supplies a list of the variables used in my analyses, their associated sources 
and the ways in which I confirm their accuracy. 
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CHAPTER 4:  ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
I. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the 379 firms in the negative 
news sample, while Panel B focuses on the 113 firms within the negative news sample that 
faced shareholder lawsuits (triggered by the negative news disclosures).  The full sample 
suffered a mean, size-adjusted return of -43.9% during the 3-day window surrounding the 
negative news disclosure.  Not surprisingly, the litigation subsample (n=113) differed from 
the non-litigation firms (n=266) in a number of respects.  Comparing the 113 sued firms to 
the 266 non-sued firms, the lawsuit firms suffer greater drops in price, are larger in terms of 
market capitalization and volume traded, and enjoyed increased share turnover 
(untabulated, two-sided tests of mean and median differences show significant differences 
across groups at the 0.05 level).  Consistent with Francis et al. (1994) and Field et al. (2005), 
the lawsuit firms do not exhibit less timely disclosure of the negative news. 
Panel C of Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the lawsuit sample with available 
settlement, insurance, price, and trading data for tests of my second and third hypotheses; 
Panel D focuses on the 116 lawsuit observations that involve trading allegations.  Consistent 
with my second hypothesis, both the mean and median settlement paid by the 116 firms 
facing trading allegations ($19.0 million and $9.0 million, respectively) exceed those paid by 
the 91 non-allegation firms ($17.6 million and $5.1 million, respectively), with two-sided 
tests of mean and median differences showing significant differences across groups at the 
0.05 level.  At the same time, the median proportion of the settlement covered by insurance 
for the trading allegation firms was 85.8%, compared to 100% for the non-allegation group 
(one-sided test of median differences, Pr >
! 
" 2=0.03), again consistent with increased 
consequences for firms with trading allegations.  In addition, the firms facing trading 
allegations differ in terms of trading volume, enjoy greater share turnover, are more likely 
audited by a “Big 4/6” firm, and are less likely to experience a restatement in the year of the 
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lawsuit (untabulated, two-sided tests of mean and median differences show significant 
differences across groups at the 0.05 level).    
Finally, prior work examining litigation limits analysis to firms in high-litigation 
industries (Johnson et al. 2000, 2004).  Looking at both Panels B and D of Table 3, 
approximately half of the litigation firms from the negative news sample and half of the firms 
in the lawsuit sample that face trading allegations operate in other industries.  This suggests 
it is useful to examine the full population of firms, rather than limiting analysis to high-
litigation firms.  
 
II. Abnormal trade and disclosure timeliness 
Panels A through D of Table 4 observe the trading and disclosure behavior of 
managers in the negative news sample and then partitions of the full sample based on the 
timeliness of their disclosure, the incidence of lawsuit filings related to the disclosure event 
and the inclusion of trading allegations within the lawsuit filings.  To partition the sample by 
timeliness, I set an indicator variable (
! 
TIMELY ) equal to one if the firm’s 
! 
TIMELINESS  score 
exceeds the median timeliness score for the sample. 
! 
UNTIMELY  refers to observations where 
! 
TIMELY  equals zero.  Panel B focuses on the difference in trading behavior between the 
timely managers and the untimely managers, while Panel C focuses on the trading behavior 
of the lawsuit managers. To partition the sample by trading allegations, I set an indicator 
variable (
! 
ITALLEGE ) equal to one if the first identified complaint filed by shareholders used 
allegations of insider trading to support their case.  To partition the sample by litigation, I set 
an indicator variable (
! 
LIT ) equal to one if the negative news disclosure triggered the filing of 
a shareholder lawsuit. 
Consistent with Jaffe (1974) and Seyhun (1986), I find evidence of abnormal trading 
prior to the disclosure of negative news that causes a large drop in price.  As shown in Panel 
A, insiders enjoyed mean (median) abnormal trading profits of $11.5 million ($1.8 million).  
The alternative metrics based on shares traded provide similar results.  Insiders sold mean 
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(median) abnormal net shares of 0.224 (0.047) million prior to disclosing the negative 
earnings news.  Given those findings, I next focus on comparisons across subgroups (based 
on disclosure timeliness and incidence of lawsuit filings). 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that managers who exhibit less timely disclosure enjoy more 
profitable trading.  Consistent with this theory, as shown in Panel B, tests of mean 
differences for all abnormal trading metrics indicate that the untimely group of managers 
traded more profitably than the timely group of managers.  The results presented in Panel C 
suggest that plaintiffs’ attorneys get it right, as managers facing trading allegations engage in 
significantly greater mean and median abnormal trade based on all trading metrics.   
Given the findings of Panels B and C, Panel D of Table 4 partitions the firms based on 
both the timeliness of disclosure and incidence of litigation.  If trading behavior influences 
lawsuit filings and if untimely managers enjoy more profitable trade, the 
“Litigation/Untimely” group should exhibit significantly more abnormal trade than the other 
three groups.  Consistent with this theory, the “Litigation/Untimely” managers enjoyed 
greater mean and median abnormal trade based on comparisons to “Litigation/Timely” 
managers, “No Litigation/Untimely” managers, and “No Litigation/Untimely” managers 
(shown in tests of differences numbers 1, 4, and 5 in Panel D).  Furthermore, significant 
differences in trading behavior when comparing the “No Litigation/Untimely” managers to 
the “Litigation/Untimely” managers (shown in test of difference number 5 in Panel D) 
suggests that trading behavior does play a role in lawsuit filings.   
As discussed in Chapter 1, Panels A and B of Figure 1 depict situations in which 
managers allegedly delayed the disclosure of negative earnings news in order to profit via 
insider trades.  Figure 4 investigates the timing of managers’ trades in relation to the drop in 
stock price for the 463 insiders of the 116 firms facing trading allegations.  I partition the 
sample based on managers’ disclosure behavior.  Panel A focuses on the trading behavior of 
the insiders of the firms with 
! 
TIMELINESS  measures that fall below the median for the full 
sample (i.e., the “UNTIMELY” disclosers), while Panel B focuses on the trading behavior of 
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the insiders of the firms with 
! 
TIMELINESS  measures that exceed the median for the full 
sample (i.e., the “TIMELY” disclosers).  I plot cumulative long-window, equal-weighted 
portfolio values from 24 months before the negative news disclosure to 2 months after 
(assuming an initial investment of $1 at the beginning of the 26-month period) as well as the 
average monthly shares sold (in thousands) by insiders.  Consistent with the evidence 
presented in Table 4, a comparison of the trading behavior exhibited in Panel A to the 
trading behavior exhibited in Panel B suggests that the UNTIMELY disclosers sell their 
shares before the market receives the negative news while the TIMELY disclosers sell their 
shares as the market reacts to the negative news.  Figure 5 replicates the analysis supplied in 
Figure 4 but focuses on the timing of managers’ option exercises.  Again, the UNTIMELY 
disclosers appear to trade in a way that suggests knowledge of the impending negative news, 
while the TIMELY disclosers do not. 
 Panels A and B of Table 5 supply the Pearson and Spearman correlations for the 
negative news sample as well as the litigation subsample.  Consistent with the results 
presented in Panels A and B of Table 3, the indicator variable for litigation, 
! 
LIT , exhibits 
significantly positive correlation to drops in price and firm size (as measured by 
! 
MVE and 
! 
VOLUME ).  More important, consistent with the theory that managers delay disclosure of 
negative news in order to profit personally, 
! 
ATP  is negatively correlated with 
! 
TIMELINESS  
(Pearson correlation coefficient = -0.125).  However, the remaining abnormal trading metrics 
do not exhibit significant correlations with 
! 
TIMELINESS .  Panel C of Table 5 provides the 
correlations for the litigation sample.  As expected, 
! 
SETTLE  positively correlates with firm 
size (i.e., 
! 
MVE and 
! 
VOLUME ), 
! 
RESTATE , and shareholder damages (i.e., 
! 
DDLOSS ).  
And, consistent with hypothesis 2, I observe a positive correlation between 
! 
ATPand 
! 
SETTLE .  
To further investigate my first hypothesis, I estimate a regression with controls for 
other factors thought to influence the timeliness of managers’ disclosures.  Table 6 provides 
the results from estimating the regression model described in Equation (5).  The significantly 
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negative coefficients for the abnormal trading variables in all five of the regression models 
provide support for my first hypothesis.  That is, more profitable abnormal trading behavior 
is associated with less timely disclosure of negative news.  The decreased level of significance 
for 
! 
ANSTand 
! 
ANST _ SHS  (0.086 and 0.096, respectively) compared to that associated 
with 
! 
ATP  (0.010) offers support for the measurement concerns discussed in Chapter 1.  
Consistent with Lang and Lundholm (1993) and Field et al. (2005), return volatility is 
negatively associated with disclosure timeliness.  Finally, as predicted, share turnover 
exhibits a positive association.   
 
III. Abnormal trade and consequences for the firm 
Shifting focus to the litigation consequences for the firm, the next table investigates 
whether abnormal trade is related to increased lawsuit settlements.  Table 7 reports the 
results of estimating the regression model described in Equation (6).  In contrast to Skinner 
(1997), I find no evidence to suggest that more timely disclosure of negative news leads to 
lower settlements; 
! 
TIMELINESS  is insignificant in all specifications.  On the other hand, 
significantly positive coefficients for 
! 
ATP , 
! 
A"IW  and 
! 
ANST   in models 1 through 3 
provide support for the theory that opportunistic trading behavior results in increased 
settlement costs for the firm.  Consistent with the correlations observed in Panel C of Table 5, 
all four models imply that settlements increase with firm size, shareholder damages, and in 
the presence of an earnings restatement.  
For robustness, Panel B of Table 7 presents the results of estimating Equation (6) 
using the settlement amount net of insurance coverage (i.e., 
! 
SETTLEMENT " (1# INSURANCE)) as the dependent variable, while removing the 
insurance coverage as an independent variable from the regression.  Again, I observe a 
positive relation between the after-insurance amount of settlement and 
! 
ATP .  However, the 
alternative measures are all no longer significant at conventional levels. 
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 Taken collectively, the evidence presented thus far suggests that some managers 
trade opportunistically prior to disclosing large, negative earnings news and, as a result, the 
firm suffers increased litigation consequences in the form of larger settlement amounts.  The 
question remains: do managers suffer repercussions associated with their trading behavior? 
 
IV. Abnormal trade and consequences for managers 
I next examine the incidence of CEO turnover in firms where insiders engaged in 
abnormal trade prior to the lawsuit filing.  In initial results (not tabulated), I find little 
evidence to support my third hypothesis.  In particular, I find no significant difference in 
CEO turnover rates between firms that faced trading allegations and those that did not 
(43.1% and 45.1%, respectively).  Focusing on CEOs that left the firm entirely (i.e., 
CEO_LEAVE=1), I find similar results (26.8% for firms that faced trading allegations, 30.6% 
for firms that did not face trading allegations).  These results, however, do not consider the 
magnitude of the insider trading profits reaped by managers of lawsuit firms. 
Table 8 presents the results of the CEO turnover regression described in Equation 
(7).  Using CEO_TURNOVER as the dependent variable, Panel A again provides no evidence 
to support my third hypothesis, as I find no relation between abnormal trade and 
employment consequences.  Panel B tells a similar story.  Focusing on CEOs that actually 
leave the lawsuit firm, I again find no relation between abnormal trade (as measured by all 
three trading metrics) and turnover.  Instead, results document increased turnover for 
managers following earnings restatements, which is consistent with recent work by 
Srinivasan (2005) and Desai et al. (2006).17  
To further investigate the degree to which managers faced repercussions from 
opportunistic trading behavior prior to disclosing the negative news that triggered the filing 
of the lawsuit, I perform a full-text search of the SEC litigation releases and federal court 
                                                             
17 In additional analyses (not tabulated), I investigate whether the combination of increased consequences 
for the firm (in the form of higher settlement amounts) and increased trading by the manager results in 
increased likelihood of employment turnover.  When looking at CEOs no longer with the firm as of the year 
after the lawsuit settles, I find a significant (at the 0.05 level), positive coefficient when I interact the 
settlement term with the trading variables. 
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actions.  Furthermore, when collecting settlement and insurance coverage information from 
the footnotes of firms’ financial statements, I noted two instances where managers paid 
monetary penalties in response to trading allegations.  In each of these cases, the firm issued 
shares of stock to the managers (at $1 per share) in exchange for the cash paid. 
As highlighted in Figure 1, the CEO is not always the insider alleged to have traded 
opportunistically prior to the negative news disclosure.  In the case of Scholastic Corporation, 
allegations focused on the trading behavior of the VP of Finance and Investor Relations (who 
sold 80 percent of his holdings in the months leading up to the negative news disclosure).18  
To address this issue, I search for actions against the firm and any individual named as a 
defendant in the first identified complaint.   For the 207 earnings-based lawsuits in the 
settlement sample, I detect no instance of SEC involvement or monetary penalties.  Rather, 
SEC actions that overlap securities litigation appear to focus on instances of insider trade in 
the context of corporate fraud. 
Overall, I find limited evidence to suggest that the managers themselves suffer 
increased consequences as a result of their trading behavior.  Consistent with recent evidence 
provided by Desai et al. (2006), I find increased management turnover following earnings 
restatements, but similar to Agrawal et al. (1999) and Beneish (1999) who examine turnover 
following incidences of fraud revelations, I find no evidence of turnover associated with 
opportunistic trading by managers of lawsuit firms.  This lack of evidence may relate to the 
inherent error associated with the measurement of employment turnover.  Because the firing 
of top executives could strengthen the bargaining position of the shareholders during 
settlement negotiations (as it may offer support for claims of a manager’s wrongdoing), I 
observe the employment of managers after the lawsuit settles.  The length of time between 
the filing and the settling of a lawsuit varies significantly by firm.  In some cases, the window 
is less than a year.  Yet, in others settlement occurs many years later.  Consequently, as the 
                                                             
18 Based on SEC filings made during the five years following the filing of the lawsuit, Scholastic’s VP 
remained in his position through the date of the settlement. 
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window of time between filing and settlement increases, my ability to detect relations in the 
data may decrease. 
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CHAPTER 5:  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Prior work indicates that potential legal and reputational consequences provide 
managers with incentives to voluntarily disclose negative news (Skinner 1994, Kasznik and 
Lev 1995, Skinner 1997, Baginski et al. 2002, Field et al. 2005).  I observe the relative 
infrequence of managers’ warnings despite the presence of these incentives and investigate 
whether profitable trading opportunities provide managers with incentives to 
delay/withhold this news.  Drawing upon an established body of insider trading literature 
(Jaffe 1974, Seyhun 1986), I examine the relation between abnormal trading profit and the 
timeliness of managers’ negative news disclosures.  In so doing, I connect the stream of 
literature examining insiders’ exploitation of information asymmetries to the stream of 
literature examining managers’ incentives to correct information asymmetries via negative 
news warnings. 
Consistent with the theory that the receipt of negative news provides managers with 
incentives to delay disclosure, I find a negative relation between abnormal trade by insiders 
prior to the market’s receipt of negative earnings news and the timeliness of disclosure.  
Further analysis indicates that this behavior results in increased litigation consequences for 
the firm and limited repercussions for managers.  That is, after controlling for a number of 
factors argued to influence settlement negotiations, I document a positive relation between 
settlement amounts and measures of abnormal trade, but I find no relation between 
abnormal trade and repercussions to managers involved in the trading.  In addition, I find no 
evidence to suggest that managers suffer via monetary penalties and/or SEC action. 
Taken collectively, my findings suggest that some managers delay negative news 
disclosures and profitably trade on information asymmetries. Consequently, future studies 
examining managers’ disclosure behavior, particularly those considering the effect of 
disclosure on litigation consequences, should consider the role of managers’ trading 
incentives. 
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FIGURE 1 
Selling shares to reduce losses before the disclosure of negative news 
 
Panel A – Scholastic Corporation 
 
 
Note:  In the case of Scholastic, the parties reached a cash settlement of $7.5 million.  In September of 2002, Scholastic announced it would record a non-recurring pre-tax charge 
of $1.9 million in the third quarter of 2002, which represents the portion of the $7.5 million that was not covered by insurance and is less than the approximately $2 million of 
trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the class period. 
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FIGURE 1 (concluded) 
Selling shares to reduce losses before the disclosure of negative news 
 
Panel B – PRI Automation 
 
 
Note:  PRI Automation did not have insurance coverage for the claims.  The parties, however, reached a cash settlement of $3.25 million, which is far less than the approximately 
$22 million in trading proceeds reaped by insiders during the early part of the class period.   
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FIGURE 2 
Profiting via option exercises before the disclosure of negative news 
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FIGURE 2 (concluded) 
Profiting via option exercises before the disclosure of negative news 
 
 
 
 
Note:  In a complaint filed on October 1, 1996, IMP shareholders allege that: “[Positive statements] enabled eight of IMP's insiders to engage in a remarkable burst of insider 
trading, selling 1,196,200 shares of their IMP stock at artificially inflated prices as high as $22.31 per share between May 3, 1996 and May 24, 1996, pocketing over $23.7 million 
for themselves -- with most of IMP's insiders unloading large portions of their holdings of IMP stock, immediately after exercising stock options to acquire the shares at just $.81-
$2.25 per share -- thus obtaining huge, risk-free profits from insider trading.” (CV-96-20826 IMP, Inc. Class Action Complaint, page 1) 
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FIGURE 3 
Sample selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  I assemble a sample of firms facing large, negative earnings news by starting with firms that suffered large price declines.  I begin by obtaining a list of CRSP firms suffering 
greater than a 35 percent drop in price in a 3-day window during 1996-2002.  As detailed in Panel A of Table 2, data restrictions result in a final “negative news” sample of 379 firms.  
As detailed in Panel B of Table 2, I obtain a sample of 513 firms that faced shareholder lawsuits during the period of 1996-2002 from litigation databases maintained by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and Stanford University.  Following Skinner (1994, 1997), I limit analysis to classic, earnings-based 10b-5 lawsuits by excluding lawsuits that allege fraud 
schemes or that relate to IPO allocations, analysts or mutual funds.  Consequently, the final “lawsuit sample” consists of 207 firms.  Of those 207 lawsuits, 116 involve allegations of 
insider trading as evidence of managers’ incentive for delayed disclosure.  For these 116 trading allegation firms, I focus my analysis on the insiders specifically named in the first 
identified complaint.  Accordingly, I calculate trading metrics for 463 individuals facing trading allegations.  Of the 113 negative news firms facing shareholder lawsuits, 62 appear in 
the final lawsuit sample with sufficient data availability and 32 appear in the sample of trading allegation firms. 
 
379  
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firms 
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FIGURE 4 
Returns and shares sold by insiders prior to and following the negative news 
disclosure 
Insiders of lawsuit firms facing trading allegations (116 firms, 463 insiders) 
 
Panel A – UNTIMELY disclosers 
 
 
Note:  Of the 207 earnings-based 10b-5 lawsuits examined in this study, 116 involve situations where shareholders (and 
their attorneys) use managers’ trading behavior to support allegations of delayed disclosure.  I limit the above analysis to 
insiders of these 116 lawsuit firms facing trading allegations.  Further, I eliminate the trading behavior of insiders not 
specifically named in the first identified complaint and, consequently, I calculate trading measures for only those 
individuals facing trading allegations (n=463).  In Panels A and B, I partition the sample based on managers’ disclosure 
behavior.  Following Skinner (1997), I calculate TIMELINESS by counting the number of days between the end of the 
fiscal quarter and the date of the negative news disclosure.  I set TIMELY equal to 1 if the firm’s timeliness score exceeds 
the median timeliness score for the sample; I set TIMELY equal to 0 for the remaining observations.  UNTIMELY refers 
to observations where TIMELY equals 0.   I plot cumulative long-window, equal-weighted portfolio values from 24 
months before the negative news disclosure (i.e., the CEdate) to 2 months after, assuming an initial of $1 in each portfolio 
(at the beginning of the 26-month period).  I plot the average monthly shares sold (in thousands) by insiders named in the 
first identified complaint using trading data obtained from Thomson Financial.  I obtain similar results when I plot 
average monthly trading proceeds in place of average monthly shares sold.
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FIGURE 4 (concluded) 
Returns and shares sold by insiders prior to and following the negative news 
disclosure 
Insiders of lawsuit firms facing trading allegations (116 firms, 463 insiders) 
 
Panel B – TIMELY disclosers 
 
Note:  Of the 207 earnings-based 10b-5 lawsuits examined in this study, 116 involve situations where shareholders (and 
their attorneys) use managers’ trading behavior to support allegations of delayed disclosure.  I limit the above analysis to 
insiders of these 116 lawsuit firms facing trading allegations.  Further, I eliminate the trading behavior of insiders not 
specifically named in the first identified complaint and, consequently, I calculate trading measures for only those 
individuals facing trading allegations (n=463).  In Panels A and B, I partition the sample based on managers’ disclosure 
behavior.  Following Skinner (1997), I calculate TIMELINESS by counting the number of days between the end of the 
fiscal quarter and the date of the negative news disclosure.  I set TIMELY equal to 1 if the firm’s timeliness score exceeds 
the median timeliness score for the sample; I set TIMELY equal to 0 for the remaining observations.  UNTIMELY refers 
to observations where TIMELY equals 0.   I plot cumulative long-window, equal-weighted portfolio values from 24 
months before the negative news disclosure (i.e., the CEdate) to 2 months after, assuming an initial of $1 in each portfolio 
(at the beginning of the 26-month period).  I plot the average monthly shares sold (in thousands) by insiders named in the 
first identified complaint using trading data obtained from Thomson Financial.  I obtain similar results when I plot 
average monthly trading proceeds in place of average monthly shares sold. 
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FIGURE 5 
Returns and options exercised prior to and following the negative news disclosure 
Insiders of lawsuit firms facing trading allegations (116 firms, 463 insiders) 
 
Panel A – UNTIMELY disclosers 
 
Note:  Of the 207 earnings-based 10b-5 lawsuits examined in this study, 116 involve situations where shareholders (and 
their attorneys) use managers’ trading behavior to support allegations of delayed disclosure.  I limit the above analysis to 
insiders of these 116 lawsuit firms facing trading allegations.  Further, I eliminate the trading behavior of insiders not 
specifically named in the first identified complaint and, consequently, I calculate trading measures for only those 
individuals facing trading allegations (n=463).  In Panels A and B, I partition the sample based on managers’ disclosure 
behavior.  Following Skinner (1997), I calculate TIMELINESS by counting the number of days between the end of the 
fiscal quarter and the date of negative news disclosure.  I set TIMELY equal to 1 if the firm’s timeliness score exceeds the 
median timeliness score for the sample; I set TIMELY equal to 0 for the remaining observations.  UNTIMELY refers to 
observations where TIMELY equals 0.   I plot cumulative long-window, equal-weighted portfolio values from 24 months 
before the negative news disclosure (i.e., the CEdate) to 2 months after, assuming $1 was in each portfolio at the 
beginning of the 26-month period.  I plot the average monthly options exercised (in thousands) by insiders named in the 
first identified complaint using trading data obtained from Thomson Financial 
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FIGURE 5 (concluded) 
Returns and options exercised prior to and following the negative news disclosure 
Insiders of lawsuit firms facing trading allegations (116 firms, 463 insiders) 
 
Panel B – TIMELY disclosers 
 
 
Note:  Of the 207 earnings-based 10b-5 lawsuits examined in this study, 116 involve situations where shareholders (and 
their attorneys) use managers’ trading behavior to support allegations of delayed disclosure.  I limit the above analysis to 
insiders of these 116 lawsuit firms facing trading allegations.  Further, I eliminate the trading behavior of insiders not 
specifically named in the first identified complaint and, consequently, I calculate trading measures for only those 
individuals facing trading allegations (n=463).  In Panels A and B, I partition the sample based on managers’ disclosure 
behavior.  Following Skinner (1997), I calculate TIMELINESS by counting the number of days between the end of the 
fiscal quarter and the date of negative news disclosure.  I set TIMELY equal to 1 if the firm’s timeliness score exceeds the 
median timeliness score for the sample; I set TIMELY equal to 0 for the remaining observations.  UNTIMELY refers to 
observations where TIMELY equals 0.   I plot cumulative long-window, equal-weighted portfolio values from 24 months 
before the negative news disclosure (i.e., the CEdate) to 2 months after, assuming $1 was in each portfolio at the 
beginning of the 26-month period.  I plot the average monthly options exercised (in thousands) by insiders named in the 
first identified complaint using trading data obtained from Thomson Financial.
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TABLE 1 – Variable definitions and data sources 
Litigation Data 
I obtain relevant lawsuit information by hand-collecting data from a number of sources. 
Settlement = the dollar amount for which the lawsuit settles (in millions). 
Insurance = the percentage of the settlement covered by director and officer liability insurance. 
Cash = 1 if the defendant paid the entire settlement amount in cash; 0 otherwise. 
CBdate 
= the date plaintiffs allege managers of the company made the first 
false or misleading statement(s) and/or failed to disclose material 
information. 
CEdate =  the date the market learns of the news that triggers the lawsuit filing. 
Period = the number of days between the CBdate and the CEdate (i.e., the period of time used to calculate plaintiffs’ alleged damages). 
ITAllege = 1 if the complaint or a press release by shareholders’ attorneys alleges insider trading as evidence of wrongdoing; 0 otherwise. 
OfferAllege 
= 1 if the complaint or press releases by shareholders’ attorneys use 
the issuance of a secondary equity offering as evidence of 
wrongdoing; 0 otherwise. 
Earnings = 1 if the nature of the lawsuit allegations are earnings-based; 0 otherwise (e.g., fraud or IPO-related). 
 
• PwC Securities Litigation Database:  Among other information, the 
database supplies the company name, class period dates, filing date, 
settlement amount, and settlement form (i.e., cash only, stock only, cash 
and stock). 
 
• Stanford Securities Litigation Database:  I confirm class period and 
filing dates by checking the PwC dates to Stanford Law School’s Securities 
Class Action Clearinghouse database (http://securities.stanford.edu/).  In 
addition, I augment the PwC sample with additional settled lawsuits. 
 
• First Identified Complaint:  I examine the first identified complaint for 
each lawsuit in order to categorize the nature of the lawsuit (e.g., fraud, 
IPO-related, earnings-based), as well as identify whether plaintiffs’ 
attorneys allege insider trading or the issuance of secondary equity offering 
as evidence of managers’ wrongdoing.   
 
• SEC Filings:  I obtain settlement information, including the amount 
covered by the company’s director and officer liability insurance (net of any 
deductibles) by reading the firms’ quarterly and annual SEC filings 
following the filing of the lawsuit through the year following the date of 
settlement (http://sec.gov). 
 
• Lexis-Nexis, Dow Jones News Service:  Performing a full-text search 
of news articles via Lexis-Nexis and Dow Jones News Service (using the 
company name and keywords of “lawsuit” and “class action”), I confirm the 
nature of the lawsuit allegations, class period dates, settlement amount, 
insurance coverage, and settlement form.   
 50 
TABLE 1 – Variable definitions and data sources 
Disclosure Data 
Timeliness 
= the number of days between the announcement of earnings (via 
forecast, preannouncement, or actual announcement) and the end of 
the fiscal quarter corresponding to the negative news disclosure. 
Timely 
= 1 if the firm’s disclosure timeliness score exceeds the median 
timeliness score for the sample; 0 otherwise. (Untimely refers to 
observations where Timely=0.) 
I obtain disclosure dates by performing a full-text search of news articles via 
Dow Jones News Service.  I obtain the report date of quarterly earnings as 
well as the date of the end of the fiscal quarter from Compustat.  Following 
Skinner (1997), I calculate a measure of disclosure timeliness (Timeliness) by 
counting the number of days between the end of the fiscal quarter and the date 
of negative news disclosure.  Under this approach, earnings forecasts result in 
positive measures of timeliness, while both earnings preannouncements and 
actual earnings announcements result in negative measures of timeliness. 
Insider Trading Data 
Trading 
Proceeds (TP) 
in millions 
=
! 
Salesi, j "TRPrice i, j  -  Purchasesi, j "TRPricei, j( )
j=1
K
#
i=1
N
# ,  
where 
! 
N = the number of insiders, 
! 
K= the number of transactions 
by insider 
! 
i  during the period, 
! 
Sales= the number of shares sold in 
transaction 
! 
j , 
! 
Purchases = the number of shares purchased in 
transaction 
! 
j , and  
! 
TRPrice  =  the price at which insider 
! 
i  
transacts (i.e., the exercise price, market price). 
Wealth 
Saved (WS) 
in millions 
=
! 
Salesi, j " TRPrice i, j - CEPrice i, j( )
j=1
K
#
i=1
N
# , 
where 
! 
CEPrice= the firm’s stock price one day after the end of the 
class period.  
 
I obtain insider filing data from Thomson Financial.   I calculate trading 
measures that incorporate the dollar value of the transactions:  Trading 
Proceeds (TP), Wealth Saved (WS), and ΔInsider Wealth (ΔIW).  
 
To facilitate comparison to prior work, I calculate a measure of net shares 
traded (NST) during the period (Summers and Sweeney 1998, Niehaus and 
Roth 1999, Johnson et al. 2004) and a measure of net shares traded deflated by 
shares outstanding (NST_SHS) (Beneish and Vargus 2002). 
 
I calculate Abnormal trading measures by subtracting the equivalent trading 
measures calculated over an equal trading window leading up to the CBdate or 
the date of the price drop (for non-lawsuit firms); I use a firm-specific trading 
window equal to the number of days in the class period for the lawsuit firms 
and for non-lawsuit firms I examine trading during the year leading up to 
disclosure.  Following prior work, I focus on the trading behavior of directors, 
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TABLE 1 – Variable definitions and data sources 
ΔInsider 
Wealth 
(ΔIW) 
in millions 
=
! 
CEHoldingsi "CEPrice i #CBHoldingsi "CBPricei( ) +
Salesi, j "TRPricei, j #Purchasesi, j "TRPrice i, j( )
j=1
K
$
+Offeringsi
% 
& 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
( 
) 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
i=1
N
$ , 
 
where 
! 
CBPrice  = the firm’s stock price at the beginning of the class 
period, 
! 
CEHoldings  = the total amount of shares held by insider 
! 
i  
at the end of the period, 
! 
CBHoldings = the total amount of shares 
held by insider 
! 
i  at the beginning of the class period, and 
! 
Offerings = the total dollar amount of cash proceeds from 
secondary offerings received by insider during the class period. 
Net Shares 
Traded 
(NST) 
= 
! 
Salesi, j  -  Purchasesi, j( )
j=1
K
"
i=1
N
" . 
Deflated Net 
Shares 
Traded 
(NST_SHS) 
= 
! 
Salesi, j /SHS -  Purchasesi, j /SHS( )
j=1
K
"
i=1
N
" , 
where 
! 
SHS  = the shares outstanding on the date of transaction
! 
j . 
officers, presidents, and vice presidents. For the 116 trading allegation firms, I 
focus my analysis on the insiders specifically named in the first identified 
complaint.  Accordingly, I calculate trading metrics for 463 individuals facing 
trading allegations.  I denote abnormal trading metrics as ATP, AWS, AΔIW, 
ANST, and ANST_SHS.   
 
 
 
CEO Consequences Data 
CEO_Turn 
= 1 if the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the firm at the end of the 
class period is no longer the CEO the year after the firm settles the 
lawsuit; 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 1 – Variable definitions and data sources 
CEO_Leave = 1 if the CEO of the firm at the end of the class period is no longer with the firm the year after the firm settles the lawsuit; 0 otherwise. 
SEC = 1 if the firm/CEO faces an SEC enforcement action in addition to the class action lawsuit; 0 otherwise. 
Penalty = 1 if the CEO faces monetary penalties relating to an SEC investigation or the funding of the settlement.   
CEOage = the CEO’s age during the year of the settlement. 
RETage = 1 if the CEO’s age exceeds 62 at the CEdate; 0 otherwise.   
CEOown = the percentage ownership of the CEO. 
High_Settle = 1 if the settlement exceeds the median settlement for the sample; 0 otherwise. 
I obtain executive compensation data, including management turnover, from 
the Compustat Executive Compensation Database and from the firms’ 
SEC filings. 
 
• I hand-collect missing data items and confirm Execucomp data by 
examining the firms’ proxy statements leading up to the end of the class 
period and through the date of settlement (http://sec.gov). 
 
• I perform a full-text search (based on company name and/or plaintiffs 
named on the first identified complaint) of the SEC litigation database to 
identify enforcement actions that relate to defendant firms 
(http://sec.gov). 
Control Variables 
In addition to the variables of interest, analyses include controls for insurance coverage (discussed in the litigation data section), restatements, audit 
quality, estimated shareholder damages (severity of the negative news), firm size (market value, volume traded), return volatility, share turnover, and 
high-litigation industries. 
Insurance = the percentage of the settlement covered by director and officer liability insurance. 
I obtain settlement information, including the amount covered by the 
company’s director and officer liability insurance (net of any deductibles) by 
reading the firms’ quarterly and annual SEC filings following the filing of the 
lawsuit through year following the date of settlement (http://sec.gov). 
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TABLE 1 – Variable definitions and data sources 
Restate = 1 if the firm restates earnings and/or announces a restatement in the year of the lawsuit filing; 0 otherwise. 
In addition to searching SEC filings, I perform a full-text search of news 
articles via Dow Jones News Service (using the company name and 
keywords of “restate” and “restatement” in the year of the CEdate) to identify 
restatements. 
Auditor = 1 if the firm is audited by a “Big Six” (“Big Four”) auditor in the year of the CEDATE; 0 otherwise.   
I hand-collect auditor information from the firms’ annual filings for the year of 
the CEdate from SEC filings (http://sec.gov).  
Damages 
= 
! 
MVE "CPReturn" 1- 1- Turnover( )
X[ ], where 
! 
MVE = 
the product of the number of common shares outstanding and the 
stock price ten days before the end of the class period, 
! 
CPReturn= 
the market-adjusted return cumulated over the class period, 
! 
Turnover  = the average ratio of trading volume to shares 
outstanding and the stock price ten days before the end of the class 
period, and
! 
X  = the number of trading days in the class period.  I use 
the natural log (LDamages) in regressions. 
Dollar 
Disclosure 
Loss 
(DDLOSS) 
= decline of market capitalization from the trading day when market 
capitalization reached its maximum during the class period to the 
trading day immediately following the end of the class period (shown 
in millions).  I use the natural log (LDDLOSS) in regressions. 
Fall = size-adjusted return during the 3-day window surrounding the negative news disclosure. 
MVE 
= the product of the number of common shares outstanding and the 
stock price ten days before the end of the class period or 10 days 
before the negative news disclosure (shown in millions).  I use the 
natural log (LMVE) in regressions. 
I obtain information required for damage calculations from CRSP.  As with 
prior work, I extend the class period to include the trading day following the 
CEdate, as the information revelation often occurs at the close of a trading day.  
 
Following Jones and Weingram (1996), Skinner (1997) uses a simplified 
version of the proportional trading model (PTM) to estimate 
shareholder damages (Damages).   Specifically, he estimates damages as a 
product of the firm’s market capitalization just before the stock price decline 
that accompanies the revelations of bad news, the magnitude of that stock price 
decline, and an estimate of the proportion of shares that were bought/sold 
during the class period.  He multiplies by minus one so that damages are 
defined positively.  In addition, he sets damages to a minimum of $1 million 
when CPReturn is positive.  For robustness, I calculate a second measure of 
shareholder damages (DDLOSS) based on the way in which attorneys calculate 
damages.  
 
Under the PSLRA, damages cannot exceed the difference between the price paid 
for the securities and the mean paid for the securities and the mean trading 
price for the 90-day period day period following the corrective disclosure. Thus, 
damages may be mitigated if the market price rebounds during the 90-day 
period following the alleged corrective disclosure.  I adjust damage estimates to 
accommodate the “bounceback” provision of the PSLRA. 
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TABLE 1 – Variable definitions and data sources 
Volume = the volume of shares traded during the class period or during the year prior to the negative news disclosure (shown in millions). 
Volatility = the standard deviation of size-adjusted, monthly returns in the year prior to the CEdate or the date of the negative news disclosure. 
Share 
Turnover 
= the average ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding during 
the year prior to the CEdate  or the date of the negative news 
disclosure. 
 
Hilit_JNP = 1 if the firm is in SIC codes 3570-3577 or 7370-7379; 0 otherwise. 
HILIT 
= 1 if the firm is in biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836), computers 
(3570-3577 and 7370-7379), electronics (3600-3674), or retailing 
(5200-5961, 8731-8734); 0 otherwise.   
I obtain firms’ SIC codes from CRSP.   Johnson et al. (2004) limits analysis to 
64 post-PSLRA lawsuits in the computer hardware (3570-3577) and computer 
software (7370-7379) industries during 1996-2000.  I code a high-litigation 
variable (Hilit_JNP) to indicate firms in SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370-7379.  
Soffer et al. (2000) and Francis et al. (1994) define “high-litigation” industries 
as: biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836), computers (3570-3577 and 7370-
7374), electronics (3600-3674), and retailing (5200-5961).  Kasznik and Lev 
(1995) define “high-litigation” using industries with SIC codes 2833-2836, 
8731-8734, 7371-7379, 3570-3577, and 3600-3674.  I code a high-litigation 
variable (HILIT) to indicate firms in any of the above SIC codes. 
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TABLE 2 
Sample selection 
 
 
Panel A – Negative news sample 
 
 
 
Panel B – Lawsuit sample 
 
 
 
Note:  I limit analysis to classic, earnings-based 10b-5 lawsuits by excluding lawsuits that allege fraud schemes (e.g., 
price-fixing, fictitious sales, etc.) or relate to IPO allocations, analysts or mutual funds.  For the 116 trading allegation 
firms, I focus my analysis on the 463 insiders specifically named in the first identified complaint.  Figure 3 depicts the 
intersection of the samples.
854    
Less: 
Firms not included in Thomson Financial's trading database 173    
IPO firms with insufficient data for abnormal trading metric calculations 101     
Other firms with insufficient data for abnormal trading metric calculations 97      
Firms with non-earnings related news triggering drop in price 66      
Firms facing drops in price surrounding events of September 11th, 2001 19       
Firms with pre-drop prices less than $5 19       (475)  
Final negative earnings news sample ("Negative news sample") 379  
Subsample of negative news firms facing litigation under Rule 10b-5 113     
Firms suffering greater than a 35% drop in price in a 3-day window during 
1996-2002
 Number of 
firms 
Lawsuits identified in PwC's litigation settlement database 489   
Additional lawsuits with settlement information from Stanford's  database 24      
Securities lawsuits with available settlement information 513    
Less: 
Remaining lawsuits with missing requisite CRSP data 136    
Lawsuits for which I could not locate insurance coverage data 64      
Lawsuits with insufficient data to calculate trading metrics 54      
Lawsuits for which I could not access/locate a complaint 52      (306)  
Final lawsuit sample 207  
Subsample of litigation firms facing insider trading allegations 116     
 Number of 
firms 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics  
 
Panel A – Negative news sample (n=379) 
 
 
Panel B – Negative news firms facing litigation (n=113) 
 
 
*, **, *** denote instances where the characteristic of the subsample of negative news firms facing litigation (n=113) 
differs significantly from that of the negative news firms not facing litigation (n=266) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively for a two-tailed test.   
 
Note:  FALL equals the size-adjusted return during the 3-day window surrounding the negative news disclosure.  
LITIGATION equals 1 if shareholders file a 10b-5 lawsuit in relation to the firm’s negative news disclosure; 0 otherwise.  
HILIT equals 1 if the firm operates in biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836), computers (3570-3577 and 7370-7379), 
electronics (3600-3674), or retailing (5200-5961, 8731-8734); 0 otherwise.  MVE equals the product of the number of 
common shares outstanding and the stock price ten days before the negative news disclosure (shown in millions).  
VOLUME equals the volume of shares traded during the year prior to the negative news disclosure (shown in millions).  
VOLATILITY equals the standard deviation of size-adjusted, monthly returns in the year prior to the date of the negative 
news disclosure.  SHARE TURNOVER equals the average ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding during the year 
leading up to the negative news disclosure.  TIMELINESS equals the number of days between the negative news 
disclosure (i.e., the negative earnings news) and the end of the fiscal quarter corresponding to the negative news 
disclosure.  Table 1 provides detailed variable definitions and data sources.
Lower Upper Std.
Quartile Quartile Dev.
FALL -0.439 -0.424 -0.386 -0.467 0.076
LITIGATION 0.298 0 0 1 0.458
HILIT 0.549 1 0 1 0.498
MVE 2404.080 799.744 431.881 1687.080 6896.390
VOLUME 203.599 76.517 37.122 174.249 449.668
VOLATILITY 0.261 0.206 0.148 0.291 0.254
SHARE TURNOVER 0.015 0.012 0.007 0.020 0.012
TIMELINESS -1.464 -5.000 -21.000 14.000 33.899
Variable Mean Median
Lower Upper Std.
Quartile Quartile Dev.
FALL -0.458 *** -0.433 ** -0.398 -0.500 0.082
HILIT 0.513 1 0 1 0.502
MVE 3206.740 *** 1047.510 *** 603.202 3139.490 5448.790
VOLUME 252.083 *** 105.484 *** 51.701 319.549 330.607
VOLATILITY 0.229 0.193 0.139 0.267 0.171
SHARE TURNOVER 0.016 0.013 * 0.008 0.021 0.011
TIMELINESS -1.035 -4.000 -22.000 13.000 34.301
Variable Mean Median
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TABLE 3 (concluded) 
Descriptive statistics  
 
Panel C – Lawsuit sample (n=207) 
 
Panel D – Lawsuit firms facing trading allegations (n=116) 
 
 
*, **, *** denote instances where the characteristic of the subsample of lawsuit firms facing trading allegations (n=116) 
differs significantly from that of the litigation firms not facing trading allegations (n=91) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively for a two-tailed test.   
 
Note:  SETTLEMENT equals the dollar amount for which the lawsuit settles (in millions).  INSURANCE equals the 
percentage of the settlement covered by director and officer liability insurance.  DDLOSS equals the decline of market 
capitalization from the trading day when market capitalization reached its maximum during the class period to the trading 
day immediately following the end of the class period (shown in millions).  RESTATE equals 1 if the firm restates 
earnings and/or announces a restatement in the year of the lawsuit filing; 0 otherwise.  AUDITOR equals 1 if a “Big Six” 
(or “Big Four”) firm audits the firm in the year of the CEdate; 0 otherwise.  HILIT equals 1 if the firm operates in 
biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836), computers (3570-3577 and 7370-7379), electronics (3600-3674), or retailing 
(5200-5961, 8731-8734); 0 otherwise.  MVE equals the product of the number of common shares outstanding and the 
stock price ten days before the negative news disclosure (i.e., the CEdate) (shown in millions).  VOLUME equals the 
volume of shares traded during the year prior to the negative news disclosure (shown in millions).  VOLATILITY equals 
the standard deviation of size-adjusted, monthly returns in the year prior to the date of the negative news disclosure.  
SHARE TURNOVER equals the average ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding during the year leading up to the 
negative news disclosure.  TIMELINESS equals the number of days between the negative news disclosure (i.e., the 
CEdate) and the end of the fiscal quarter corresponding to the negative news disclosure. CEO TURNOVER equals 1 if 
the CEO of the firm at the end of the class period (i.e., on the CEdate) is no longer the CEO the year after the firm settles 
Lower Upper Std.
Quartile Quartile Dev.
SETTLEMENT 18.421 7.500 3.000 15.000 41.727
INSURANCE 0.714 0.920 0.480 1.000 0.356
DDLOSS 2002.870 536.220 204.146 1394.250 6892.380
RESTATE 0.430 0 0 1 0.496
ITALLEGE 0.560 1 0 1 0.498
AUDITOR 0.859 1 1 1 0.349
HILIT 0.440 0 0 1 0.498
MVE 3095.040 410.386 138.427 985.208 13879.170
VOLUME 172.338 75.210 36.316 189.157 304.972
VOLATILITY 0.252 0.210 0.146 0.286 0.233
SHARE TURNOVER 0.014 0.010 0.006 0.020 0.010
TIMELINESS -13.232 -13 -36 8 41.589
CEO TURNOVER 0.442 0 0 1 0.498
CEO LEAVE 0.289 0 0 1 0.455
Variable Mean Median
Lower Upper Std.
Quartile Quartile Dev.
SETTLEMENT 19.021 *** 8.950 *** 3.800 17.250 33.477
INSURANCE 0.683 * 0.858 * 0.395 1.000 0.365
DDLOSS 1635.760 *** 677.138 *** 298.271 1795.340 2822.940
RESTATE 0.371 ** 0 ** 0 1 0.485
AUDITOR 0.913 ** 1 *** 1 1 0.283
HILIT 0.500 ** 1 ** 0 1 0.502
MVE 2340.290 ** 487.436 * 209.507 1093.780 7444.950
VOLUME 212.606 *** 97.883 *** 52.624 232.995 355.798
VOLATILITY 0.234 0.219 0.152 0.291 0.110
SHARE TURNOVER 0.016 *** 0.014 *** 0.007 0.023 0.010
TIMELINESS -10.767 * -11 -29 9 29.792
CEO TURNOVER 0.435 0 0 1 0.498
CEO LEAVE 0.306 0 0 1 0.463
Variable Mean Median
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the lawsuit; 0 otherwise.  CEO LEAVE equals 1 if the CEO of the firm at the end of the class period is no longer with the 
firm the year after the firm settles the lawsuit; 0 otherwise.  Table 1 provides detailed variable definitions and data 
sources.
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TABLE 4 
Evidence of abnormal trade 
 
Panel A - Negative news sample 
 
         
    n Mean Median Q1 Q3  
         
 ATP 379 11.483 1.844 -2.143 15.332  
 ANST 379 0.224 0.047 -0.099 0.441  
 ANST_SHS 379 0.8% 0.1% -0.3% 1.6%  
         
 
 
Panel B – Negative news sample partitioned by timeliness 
 
   
 
Timely 
 
Untimely 
 
Tests of Differences 
    
(p-values) 
 
   n Mean Med. Q1 Q3 n Mean Med. Q1 Q3 Mean Med. 
               
 ATP 187 8.887 1.586 -4.658 12.408 192 14.012 1.930 -0.443 23.162 0.04 0.32 
 ANST 187 0.156 0.033 -0.145 0.346 192 0.290 0.065 -0.061 0.487 0.09 0.32 
 ANST_SHS 187 0.3% 0.1% -0.4% 1.4% 192 1.3% 0.2% -0.2% 1.7% 0.06 0.07 
               
 
 
 60 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
Evidence of abnormal trade 
 
Panel C – Lawsuit sample partitioned by trading allegations 
 
 
No trading allegations 
 
Trading allegations 
 
 
Tests of Differences 
(p-values) 
 
  
  
n Mean Med. Q1 Q3 n Mean Med. Q1 Q3 Mean Med. 
               
 ATP 91 -1.636 -0.155 -2.160 0.367 116 16.880 5.119 0.300 15.647 <0.01 <0.01 
 ANST 91 -0.013 -0.006 -0.106 0.025 116 0.644 0.178 0.006 0.763 <0.01 <0.01 
 ANST_SHS 91 2.0% 0.0% -0.6% 0.1% 116 1.7% 0.7% 0.0% 2.1% <0.01 <0.01 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Evidence of abnormal trade 
 
Panel D – Negative news sample partitioned by litigation and timeliness 
 
 Timely Untimely  
  
  
n Mean Med. Q1 Q3 n Mean Med. Q1 Q3  
              
Litigation             
 ATP 60 8.664 1.102 -4.998 12.386 53 20.837 7.834 -2.078 41.413  
 ANST 60 0.239 0.065 -0.149 0.393 53 0.456 0.174 -0.038 0.961  
 ANST_SHS 60 0.6% 0.1% -0.3% 1.4% 53 1.7% 0.5% 0.0% 2.5%  
              
No Litigation             
 ATP 127 8.992 2.056 -3.750 12.450 139 11.410 1.238 -0.190 14.289  
 ANST 127 0.117 0.021 -0.145 0.313 139 0.227 0.020 -0.062 0.364  
 ANST_SHS 127 0.1% 0.0% -0.4% 1.4% 139 1.1% 0.1% -0.3% 1.6%  
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TABLE 4 (concluded) 
Evidence of abnormal trade  
 
Tests of Differences 
 
ATP ANST ANST_SHS 
 p-value for test of 
differences 
p-value for test of 
differences 
p-value for test of 
differences 
 
Prediction 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
       
1. Litigation / Timely < Litigation / Untimely 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.04 
2. Litigation / Timely ? No Litigation / Timely 0.36 0.39 0.22 0.16 0.29 0.09 
3. Litigation / Timely ? No Litigation / Untimely 0.38 0.79 0.88 0.33 0.81 0.79 
4.  Litigation / Untimely > No Litigation / Timely 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
5. Litigation / Untimely > No Litigation / Untimely 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.04 
6. No Litigation / Timely < No Litigation / Untimely 0.17 0.36 0.19 0.45 0.15 0.13 
          
          
Note:  In Panels B and D, I partition the sample based on managers’ disclosure behavior.  Following Skinner (1997), I calculate TIMELINESS by counting the number of days 
between the end of the fiscal quarter and the date of negative news disclosure.  I set TIMELY equal to 1 if the firm’s timeliness score exceeds the median timeliness score for the 
sample; I set TIMELY equal to 0 for the remaining observations.  UNTIMELY refers to observations where TIMELY equals 0.  In Panel C, I partition the sample based on whether 
shareholders’ attorneys use evidence of managers’ trading to support their claim of delayed disclosure.  In addition to partitioning based on managers’ disclosure behavior, in Panel D I 
partition the negative news sample based on the presence of a shareholder lawsuit in relation to the disclosure.  I set LITIGATION equal to 1 if shareholders file a 10b-5 lawsuit in 
relation to the firm’s negative news disclosure; 0 otherwise.  ATP (abnormal trading proceeds) equals the total amount of trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the year leading 
up to the negative news disclosure less the total amount of trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the equivalent prior window.  ANST (abnormal net shares traded) equals the 
total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure less the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less 
purchases) by insiders during the equivalent prior window.  ANST_SHS equals ANST divided by shares outstanding on the date of the transaction. Table 1 provides detailed variable 
definitions and data sources.
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TABLE 5 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients above (below) the diagonal 
 
Panel A – Negative news sample (n=379) 
 
 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
 
Note:  FALL equals the size-adjusted return during the 3-day window surrounding the negative news disclosure.  LITIGATION equals 1 if shareholders file a 10b-5 lawsuit in 
relation to the firm’s negative news disclosure; 0 otherwise.  HILIT equals 1 if the firm operates in biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836), computers (3570-3577 and 7370-7379), 
electronics (3600-3674), or retailing (5200-5961, 8731-8734); 0 otherwise.  MVE equals the product of the number of common shares outstanding and the stock price ten days before 
the negative news disclosure (shown in millions).  VOLUME equals the volume of shares traded during the year prior to the negative news disclosure (shown in millions).  
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1.000 0.168 0.003 -0.051 -0.081 0.063 0.099 0.049 0.024 0.006 0.002
***
0.167 1.000 -0.047 0.076 0.070 -0.083 0.047 0.008 0.053 0.077 0.044
*** *
0.027 -0.047 1.000 0.059 0.148 0.130 0.212 0.007 0.098 0.065 0.013
*** *** *** *
-0.006 0.236 0.131 1.000 0.666 -0.065 -0.050 -0.036 0.039 0.008 -0.026
*** *** ***
-0.021 0.236 0.246 0.772 1.000 -0.044 0.280 -0.006 0.121 0.049 -0.031
*** *** *** *** **
0.054 -0.077 0.259 -0.021 0.108 1.000 0.334 -0.119 0.061 0.028 0.021
*** ** *** **
0.123 0.075 0.326 0.061 0.475 0.384 1.000 0.077 0.069 -0.032 -0.051
** *** *** ***
0.061 0.016 0.020 0.036 0.071 -0.142 0.089 1.000 -0.125 -0.093 -0.095
*** * *** * *
0.021 0.031 0.121 0.115 0.039 0.181 0.107 -0.108 1.000 0.828 0.637
*** ** *** ** ** *** ***
0.024 0.091 0.073 0.091 0.014 0.121 0.043 -0.063 0.880 1.000 0.752
* *** *** ***
0.019 0.066 0.052 -0.006 -0.075 0.129 0.029 -0.066 0.834 0.952 1.000
*** *** ***
TIMELINESS
ATP
ANST
ANST_SHS
LITIGATION
HILIT
MVE
VOLUME
VOLATILITY
SHARE TURNOVER
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VOLATILITY equals the standard deviation of size-adjusted, monthly returns in the year prior to the date of the negative news disclosure.  SHARE TURNOVER equals the average 
ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure.  TIMELINESS equals the number of days between the negative news 
disclosure (i.e., the negative earnings news) and the end of the fiscal quarter corresponding to the negative news disclosure.  ATP (abnormal trading proceeds) equals the total amount 
of trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure less the total amount of trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the equivalent 
prior window.  ANST (abnormal net shares traded) equals the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the year leading up to the negative news 
disclosure less the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the equivalent prior window.  ANST_SHS equals ANST divided by shares outstanding 
on the date of the transaction.  Table 1 provides detailed variable definitions and data sources.
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients above (below) the diagonal  
 
Panel B – Litigation firms within the negative news sample (n=113) 
 
 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
 
Note:  FALL equals the size-adjusted return during the 3-day window surrounding the negative news disclosure.  HILIT equals 1 if the firm operates in biotechnology (SIC codes 
2833-2836), computers (3570-3577 and 7370-7379), electronics (3600-3674), or retailing (5200-5961, 8731-8734); 0 otherwise.  MVE equals the product of the number of common 
shares outstanding and the stock price ten days before the negative news disclosure (shown in millions).  VOLUME equals the volume of shares traded during the year prior to the 
negative news disclosure (shown in millions).  VOLATILITY equals the standard deviation of size-adjusted, monthly returns in the year prior to the date of the negative news 
disclosure.  SHARE TURNOVER equals the average ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure.  TIMELINESS equals 
the number of days between the negative news disclosure (i.e., the negative earnings news) and the end of the fiscal quarter corresponding to the negative news disclosure.  ATP 
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1.000 -0.015 -0.047 -0.082 0.044 0.167 0.121 0.151 0.069 -0.046
** *
-0.040 1.000 -0.052 0.152 0.302 0.336 -0.062 0.003 0.007 0.014
*** ***
0.032 0.003 1.000 0.620 -0.137 -0.124 0.005 -0.031 -0.049 -0.104
***
-0.054 0.148 0.785 1.000 -0.010 0.189 -0.043 0.048 0.051 -0.061
*** **
0.065 0.314 -0.144 0.142 1.000 0.565 0.098 0.097 0.107 0.164
*** ***
0.205 0.367 -0.040 0.388 0.564 1.000 0.041 0.084 0.018 0.060
** *** ***
0.137 -0.116 -0.084 -0.029 -0.015 0.039 1.000 -0.205 -0.118 -0.147
** *
0.138 0.016 -0.033 -0.065 0.203 0.156 -0.180 1.000 0.841 0.686
** * ** *** ***
0.070 0.006 -0.002 -0.002 0.220 0.113 -0.118 0.926 1.000 0.780
** *** *
0.011 0.029 -0.132 -0.120 0.289 0.167 -0.132 0.889 0.940 1.000
* *** ***
ANST
ANST_SHS
VOLATILITY
SHARE TURNOVER
TIMELINESS
ATP
HILIT
MVE
VOLUME
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(abnormal trading proceeds) equals the total amount of trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure less the total amount of trading 
proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the equivalent prior window.  ANST (abnormal net shares traded) equals the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders 
during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure less the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the equivalent prior window.  
ANST_SHS equals ANST divided by shares outstanding on the date of the transaction.  Table 1 provides detailed variable definitions and data sources.
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TABLE 5 (concluded) 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients above (below) the diagonal 
 
Panel C – Lawsuit sample of firms facing trading allegations (n=116)  
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1.000 -0.235 0.494 0.236 0.104 -0.005 0.352 0.588 -0.210 0.047 0.055 0.337 0.259 -0.038 0.139 0.164
*** *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *
-0.347 1.000 0.044 -0.154 -0.045 0.184 0.104 0.028 0.159 0.009 0.072 0.119 0.111 0.149 -0.098 -0.184
*** * ** * **
0.471 -0.062 1.000 -0.075 0.152 0.040 0.888 0.806 -0.270 -0.102 0.122 0.293 0.199 -0.083 0.132 0.159
*** * *** *** *** *** ** *
0.231 -0.148 -0.043 1.000 0.106 0.018 -0.116 0.008 0.006 0.030 -0.049 -0.047 0.016 -0.050 0.198 0.185
*** **
0.273 -0.054 0.340 0.106 1.000 0.188 0.080 0.141 -0.042 0.101 -0.006 0.124 0.118 0.048 0.130 0.127
*** *** **
-0.048 0.181 0.082 0.018 0.188 1.000 0.014 0.201 0.323 0.358 0.011 -0.006 0.024 0.048 0.082 0.023
** *** ***
0.469 -0.065 0.811 -0.069 0.235 -0.022 1.000 0.690 -0.260 -0.105 0.114 0.191 0.085 -0.083 0.007 0.049
*** *** *** *** **
0.364 -0.019 0.721 -0.035 0.241 0.250 0.657 1.000 -0.136 0.227 0.178 0.371 0.211 -0.090 0.113 0.095
*** *** *** * *** ** *** ***
-0.161 0.145 -0.142 0.091 -0.109 0.358 -0.332 0.006 1.000 0.405 -0.175 0.003 0.018 0.115 0.037 -0.131
** *** *** *** *
-0.015 -0.085 0.000 0.024 0.129 0.390 -0.037 0.448 0.394 1.000 0.029 -0.058 -0.069 -0.054 0.102 -0.078
*** *** ***
-0.029 -0.040 0.127 -0.022 -0.003 -0.003 0.117 0.126 -0.170 0.033 1.000 0.020 -0.104 -0.162 -0.002 0.133
* * **
0.351 0.028 0.371 -0.042 0.143 -0.066 0.430 0.271 0.016 -0.020 -0.099 1.000 0.760 0.496 0.133 0.121
*** *** * *** *** *** ***
0.185 -0.005 0.342 -0.142 0.117 -0.094 0.339 0.260 0.004 0.020 -0.093 0.849 1.000 0.850 0.020 0.064
** *** ** * *** *** ***
-0.090 -0.005 -0.060 -0.189 -0.040 -0.133 -0.045 -0.074 0.113 0.047 -0.116 0.648 0.844 1.000 -0.104 -0.050
***
0.309 -0.118 0.217 0.198 0.130 0.082 0.143 0.208 0.081 0.116 0.034 0.160 0.082 -0.038 1.000 0.756
*** ***
0.259 -0.208 0.192 0.185 0.127 0.023 0.110 0.147 -0.086 -0.062 0.172 0.139 0.128 0.026 0.756 1.000
*** ** ** ** ***
ANST
ANST_SHS
CEO TURNOVER
CEO LEAVE
VOLATILITY
SHARE TURNOVER
TIMELINESS
ATP
AUDITOR
HILIT
MVE
VOLUME
INSURANCE
DDLOSS
RESTATE
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*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
 
Note:  SETTLEMENT equals the dollar amount for which the lawsuit settles (in millions).  INSURANCE equals the percentage of the settlement covered by director and officer 
liability insurance.  DDLOSS equals the decline of market capitalization from the trading day when market capitalization reached its maximum during the class period to the trading 
day immediately following the end of the class period (shown in millions).  RESTATE equals 1 if the firm restates earnings and/or announces a restatement in the year of the lawsuit 
filing; 0 otherwise.  AUDITOR equals 1 if a “Big Six” (or “Big Four”) firm audits the firm in the year of the CEdate; 0 otherwise.  HILIT equals 1 if the firm operates in biotechnology 
(SIC codes 2833-2836), computers (3570-3577 and 7370-7379), electronics (3600-3674), or retailing (5200-5961, 8731-8734); 0 otherwise.  MVE equals the product of the number of 
common shares outstanding and the stock price ten days before the negative news disclosure (i.e., the CEdate) (shown in millions).  VOLUME equals the volume of shares traded 
during the year prior to the negative news disclosure (shown in millions).  VOLATILITY equals the standard deviation of size-adjusted, monthly returns in the year prior to the date of 
the negative news disclosure.  SHARE TURNOVER equals the average ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure.  
TIMELINESS equals the number of days between the negative news disclosure (i.e., the CEdate) and the end of the fiscal quarter corresponding to the negative news disclosure. 
CEO TURNOVER equals 1 if the CEO of the firm at the end of the class period (i.e., on the CEdate) is no longer the CEO the year after the firm settles the lawsuit; 0 otherwise.  CEO 
LEAVE equals 1 if the CEO of the firm at the end of the class period is no longer with the firm the year after the firm settles the lawsuit; 0 otherwise.  ATP (abnormal trading proceeds) 
equals the total amount of trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure less the total amount of trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders 
during the equivalent prior window.  ANST (abnormal net shares traded) equals the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the year leading up to 
the negative news disclosure less the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the equivalent prior window.  ANST_SHS equals ANST divided by 
shares outstanding on the date of the transaction.  Table 1 provides detailed variable definitions and data sources. 
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TABLE 6 
Disclosure timeliness and abnormal trade 
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*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
Note:  TIMELINESS equals the number of days between the negative news disclosure (i.e., the CEdate) and the end of the fiscal quarter corresponding to the negative news 
disclosure.  ATP (abnormal trading proceeds) equals the total amount of trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure less the total 
amount of trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the equivalent prior window.  ANST (abnormal net shares traded) equals the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less 
purchases) by insiders during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure less the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the equivalent 
prior window.  ANST_SHS equals ANST divided by shares outstanding on the date of the transaction.  I estimate models 1 through 4 using the full negative news sample (n=379) and 
model 5 using the litigation subsample (n=113).  VOLATILITY equals the standard deviation of size-adjusted, monthly returns in the year prior to the date of the negative news 
disclosure.  SHARE TURNOVER equals the average ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure.  FALL equals the size-
adjusted return during the 3-day window surrounding the negative news disclosure.  MVE equals the product of the number of common shares outstanding and the stock price ten 
days before the negative news disclosure (shown in millions); I use the log (LMVE) in the regressions.  HILIT equals 1 if the firm operates in biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836), 
computers (3570-3577 and 7370-7379), electronics (3600-3674), or retailing (5200-5961, 8731-8734); 0 otherwise.  FALL equals the size-adjusted return during the 3-day window 
surrounding the negative news disclosure.   Results remain unchanged when I replace HILIT with controls for industry classification based on Fama and French (1997).  Table 1 
provides detailed variable definitions and data sources. 
Predicted
Relation
-18.31 0.198 -16.11 0.3411 -15.78 0.267 -13.55 0.340 -21.37 0.421
ATP - -0.13 0.010 *** -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.20 0.012 **
A!IW - -- -- -0.09 0.041 ** -- -- -- -- -- --
ANST - -- -- -- -- -3.05 0.086 * -- -- -- --
ANST_SHS - -- -- -- -- -- -- -57.05 0.096 * -- --
- -20.57 0.005 *** -21.48 0.005 *** -20.96 0.004 *** -21.14 0.004 *** 30.30 0.189
+ 360.29 0.019 ** 356.89 0.024 ** 333.82 0.031 ** 334.48 0.031 ** -62.44 0.859
+ 2.80 0.406 2.23 0.495 1.99 0.553 1.23 0.713 -2.82 0.644
+ 0.51 0.887 0.31 0.776 0.28 0.939 0.06 0.986 -6.70 0.328
+ 21.88 0.338 21.75 0.453 21.24 0.355 21.13 0.358 64.47 0.102
Model 1
Intercept
Trading
Pr > |t|
Volatility
Share turnover
Adj. R2
Size (LMVE)
HILIT
Fall
Model 4
2.37%
Model 5
3.89%
Coeff. Est. Pr > |t| Coeff. Est. Pr > |t|
Model 2 Model 3
3.40% 2.82% 2.42%
Coeff. Est. Pr > |t| Coeff. Est. Pr > |t| Coeff. Est.
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TABLE 7 
Settlement regressions 
 
Panel A – Settlement 
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*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
Note:  SETTLEMENT equals the dollar amount for which the lawsuit settles (in millions).  ATP (abnormal trading 
proceeds) equals the total amount of trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the year leading up to the negative news 
disclosure less the total amount of trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the equivalent prior window.  ANST 
(abnormal net shares traded) equals the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the year 
leading up to the negative news disclosure less the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during 
the equivalent prior window.  ANST_SHS equals ANST divided by shares outstanding on the date of the transaction. 
TIMELINESS equals the number of days between the negative news disclosure (i.e., the CEdate) and the end of the fiscal 
quarter corresponding to the negative news disclosure.  DDLOSS equals the decline of market capitalization from the trading 
day when market capitalization reached its maximum during the class period to the trading day immediately following the end 
of the class period (shown in millions); I use the log (LDDLOSS) in the regressions.  VOLUME equals the volume of shares 
traded during the year prior to the negative news disclosure (shown in millions).  RESTATEMENT equals 1 if the firm 
restates earnings and/or announces a restatement in the year of the lawsuit filing; 0 otherwise.  INSURANCE equals the 
percentage of the settlement covered by director and officer liability insurance.  Table 1 provides detailed variable definitions 
and data sources.  Results remain unchanged when I include a control for high-litigation industries (HILIT or HILIT_JNP) 
or when I include MVE as the proxy for size in the regressions.  
-3.87 -5.21 -2.68 -7.50
(0.78) (0.65) (0.85) (0.59)
ATP + 0.15
(0.01***)
A!IW + 0.09
(0.05**)
ANST + 3.31
(0.05**)
ANST_SHS + 40.85
(0.48)
- -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03
(0.72) (0.67) (0.87) (0.70)
+ 7.23 9.13 6.87 8.62
(0.10*) (0.05**) (0.16) (0.08*)
VOLUME + 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.00***) (0.00***) (0.00***) (0.00***)
+ 14.35 14.13 13.68 14.13
(0.00***) (0.00***) (0.01***) (0.01***)
INSURANCE - -21.88 -20.4 -21.86 -21.07
(0.00***) (0.00***) (0.00***) (0.00***)
45.8% 45.6% 45.4% 43.8%
Intercept
Trading
TIMELINESS
LDDLOSS
--
RESTATEMENT
Adj. R2
--
--
--
Predicted 
Relation
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
1 2 3 4
Model
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TABLE 7 (concluded) 
Settlement regressions 
 
Panel B – Settlement net of insurance coverage 
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*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
Note:  SETTLEMENT equals the dollar amount for which the lawsuit settles (in millions).  INSURANCE equals the 
percentage of the settlement covered by director and officer liability insurance.  ATP (abnormal trading proceeds) equals the 
total amount of trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure less the total 
amount of trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the equivalent prior window.  ANST (abnormal net shares traded) 
equals the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the year leading up to the negative 
news disclosure less the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the equivalent prior 
window.  ANST_SHS equals ANST divided by shares outstanding on the date of the transaction. TIMELINESS equals the 
number of days between the negative news disclosure (i.e., the CEdate) and the end of the fiscal quarter corresponding to the 
negative news disclosure.  DDLOSS equals the decline of market capitalization from the trading day when market 
capitalization reached its maximum during the class period to the trading day immediately following the end of the class 
period (shown in millions); I use the log (LDDLOSS) in the regressions.  VOLUME equals the volume of shares traded 
during the year prior to the negative news disclosure (shown in millions).  RESTATEMENT equals 1 if the firm restates 
earnings and/or announces a restatement in the year of the lawsuit filing; 0 otherwise.  Table 1 provides detailed variable 
definitions and data sources.  Results remain unchanged when I include a control for high-litigation industries (HILIT or 
HILIT_JNP) or when I include MVE as the proxy for size in the regressions. 
-0.86 -3.34 -1.05 -3.05
(0.94) (0.79) (0.93) (0.81)
ATP + 0.12
(0.04**)
A!IW + 0.06
(0.11)
ANST + 1.72
(0.29)
ANST_SHS + -10.50
(0.42)
- 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.82) (0.45) (0.78) (0.94)
+ -1.22 0.37 -0.95 0.11
(0.39) (0.45) (0.42) (0.46)
VOLUME + 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04
(0.00***) (0.00***) (0.00***) (0.00***)
+ 12.15 11.65 11.65 11.69
(0.01***) (0.01***) (0.01***) (0.01***)
24.9% 22.8% 23.4% 22.7%
2 3 4
----
Predicted 
Relation
--
--
--
--
--
Model
--
--
1
RESTATEMENT
Adj. R2
--
--
--
Intercept
Trading
TIMELINESS
LDDLOSS
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TABLE 8 
Logistic regressions examining CEO turnover 
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Panel A – Dependent variable = CEO_TURNOVER 
 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
Note:  CEO_TURNOVER equals 1 if the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the firm at the end of the class period is no longer 
the CEO the year after the firm settles the lawsuit; 0 otherwise.  ATP (abnormal trading proceeds) equals the total amount of 
trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure less the total amount of 
trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the equivalent prior window.  ANST (abnormal net shares traded) equals the 
total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the year leading up to the negative news 
disclosure less the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the equivalent prior window.  
ANST_SHS equals ANST divided by shares outstanding on the date of the transaction.  CEO_AGE equals the CEO’s age 
during the year of the settlement.  DDLOSS equals the decline of market capitalization from the trading day when market 
capitalization reached its maximum during the class period to the trading day immediately following the end of the class 
period (shown in millions); I use the log (LDDLOSS) in the regressions.  SETTLEMENT equals the dollar amount for which 
the lawsuit settles (in millions).  MVE equals the product of the number of common shares outstanding and the stock price 
ten days before the negative news disclosure (shown in millions); I use the log (LMVE) in the regressions.  RESTATEMENT 
equals 1 if the firm restates earnings and/or announces a restatement in the year of the lawsuit filing; 0 otherwise.  HILIT 
equals 1 if the firm operates in biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836), computers (3570-3577 and 7370-7379), electronics 
(3600-3674), or retailing (5200-5961, 8731-8734); 0 otherwise. Results remain unchanged when I replace HILIT with 
controls for industry classification based on Fama and French (1997).  Table 1 provides detailed variable definitions and data 
sources. 
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TABLE 8 (concluded) 
Logistic regressions examining CEO turnover 
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*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
Note:  CEO_LEAVE equals 1 if the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the firm at the end of the class period is no longer with 
the firm the year after the firm settles the lawsuit; 0 otherwise.  ATP (abnormal trading proceeds) equals the total amount of 
trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the year leading up to the negative news disclosure less the total amount of 
trading proceeds enjoyed by insiders during the equivalent prior window.  ANST (abnormal net shares traded) equals the 
total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the year leading up to the negative news 
disclosure less the total amount of net shares sold (i.e., sales less purchases) by insiders during the equivalent prior window.  
ANST_SHS equals ANST divided by shares outstanding on the date of the transaction.  CEO_AGE equals the CEO’s age 
during the year of the settlement.  DDLOSS equals the decline of market capitalization from the trading day when market 
capitalization reached its maximum during the class period to the trading day immediately following the end of the class 
period (shown in millions); I use the log (LDDLOSS) in the regressions.  SETTLEMENT equals the dollar amount for which 
the lawsuit settles (in millions).  MVE equals the product of the number of common shares outstanding and the stock price 
ten days before the negative news disclosure (shown in millions); I use the log (LMVE) in the regressions.  RESTATEMENT 
equals 1 if the firm restates earnings and/or announces a restatement in the year of the lawsuit filing; 0 otherwise.  HILIT 
equals 1 if the firm operates in biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836), computers (3570-3577 and 7370-7379), electronics 
(3600-3674), or retailing (5200-5961, 8731-8734); 0 otherwise. Results remain unchanged when I replace HILIT with 
controls for industry classification based on Fama and French (1997).  Table 1 provides detailed variable definitions and data 
sources.
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